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SUPERFUND CHAOS THEORY:
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE LOWER
FEDERAL COURTS DON’T FOLLOW
THE SUPREME COURT
Steven Ferrey*
ABSTRACT
There is legal chaos in the national Superfund. The Supreme Court reversed
decisions of eleven federal circuit courts in United States v. Atlantic Research
Corp.  There is no instance in modern Supreme Court history where the Court
reversed every federal circuit court in the country, as it did in Atlantic Re-
search.  The Supreme Court’s reversal was through a unanimous decision.  This
was extraordinary: It not only reversed the entire legal interpretation of one of
America’s most critical statutes, but also re-allocated billions of dollars among
private parties.
The Supreme Court, when it rendered its decision, seemed to be rectifying a
bottleneck in Superfund remediation of hazardous waste.  However, in the dec-
ade since this Supreme Court decision, several federal trial and circuit courts
have circumvented the Supreme Court command.  This article illustrates how the
lower federal courts have done this without violating Article III of the Constitu-
tion, by re-defining a one-word term.
The practical impact has been chaos in hazardous substance remediation
across the U.S., affecting an estimated 600,000 contaminated waste sites.  There
are huge dollar impacts: addressing the 350,000 remaining contaminated sites in
the U.S. would cost up to one-quarter trillion dollars, or an expenditure of $6-8
billion annually.
This Article analyzes how the lower federal courts have circumvented the
Supreme Court decisions, with particular focus on decisions and legal prestidigita-
tion in the most recent four years.  This lower court inversion of the law is
without much basis in law, and resurrects exactly what the Supreme Court
thought it had overruled unanimously.  What transpired in enforcement in the
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lower courts is not what the Supreme Court’s opinion contemplated.  This Article
examines the method by which the lower federal courts have created an ongoing
legal mechanism to circumvent the most important Supreme Court holding in a
critical area of the economy.
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I. CIRCUMVENTING THE SUPREME COURT
There is legal chaos in the national Superfund program.1  Recent lower
court decisions create no judicial order or consistency of implementation.
1. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), is also commonly known as the “Superfund.”  This is discussed in more detail
infra Section II.
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The Supreme Court in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.2 reversed de-
cisions of eleven federal circuit courts—every appellate court that had de-
cided a case.3  How rare is this?  There is no instance in modern Supreme
Court history where the Court reversed every federal circuit court in the
country, as it did there.4  Further, it, in effect, reversed the courts of appeal
in a unanimous Supreme Court opinion.5
There is a tortuous judicial history.  Every federal court of appeals in
the country had closed access for private parties to CERCLA Section 107
cost recovery, fundamentally frustrating private clean up of U.S. hazardous
waste.  Then, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion to reopen
this broad legal boulevard, by overturning the unanimous decisions of every
federal appellate court.6  This was extraordinary: It not only reversed the
circuit court interpretations of one of America’s most essential statutes, but
also reallocated billions of dollars among private parties.  However, in the
decade since this Supreme Court decision, several federal trial and circuit
courts have openly circumvented the Supreme Court’s command, to reopen
CERCLA Section 107 cost recovery to private parties.
Can this lower court circumvention happen under Article III of the
Constitution?  The Supreme Court, in its Atlantic Research decision, did not
define an ordinary adverb used in its opinion that it thought was not subject
to ambiguity: “voluntarily.”7  However, when billions of dollars are in-
volved, every undefined term is subject to reconstruction and interpreta-
tion.  Lower court re-interpretation of “voluntarily” has created uneven and
contradictory terrain in the national legal landscape.
The Superfund’s two cost recovery mechanisms, Sections 107 and 113,
are not identical, or even similar, cost redistribution mechanisms for plain-
tiffs who incur costs to remediate hazardous waste.8  They impose funda-
2. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 131 (2007).  This case affirmed
that CERCLA allows potentially responsible parties to recover cleanup costs from other
potentially responsible parties via an avenue previously closed by all other circuit courts. Id.
3. See discussion infra Section II.C. and accompanying notes.
4. Research undertaken by attorney Helene Newberg, a research assistant, looking at
this precise question, working in conjunction with the librarians at Suffolk University Law
School, was unable to document a situation where the Supreme Court unanimously effec-
tively overturned opinions of all federal circuit courts covering all 50 states, or find any
documentation of this having happened before.  In Atlantic Research, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Atl. Research v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 459 F.3d 827
(8th Cir. 2006), which was rendered after Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543
U.S. 157 (2004). There, the Eight Circuit had reversed itself to open up private PRP access
to Section 107 cost recovery and bring the appeal to the Supreme Court.
5. Atl. Research, 551 U.S. 128.
6. Id. at 131.
7. Id.
8. See infra Section II.B.
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mentally opposed types of liability, they require different standards of
proof, and their different statutes of limitations are often fatal to claimants.9
Section 113 can leave a party with no legal remedy whatsoever because of
lack of prior litigation against the claiming party.10  These two statutory
cost recovery provisions are not interchangeable.11  They alter the outcome
of how billions of dollars of waste liability are allocated in America.12
What is the impact of lower court subterfuge of a unanimous Supreme
Court opinion that consciously reversed all of these same lower federal
courts?  The impact of some recent lower court decisions has been to dis-
courage private party remediation (99% of all U.S. cleanup activities) of
hazardous waste sites.13  These inconsistent lower court decisions have cre-
ated confusion and chaos in hazardous substance remediation across the
United States, affecting an estimated 450,000—600,000 contaminated waste
sites in the U.S.14  There are huge financial impacts: Addressing remaining
contaminated sites in the U.S. would cost up to one-quarter trillion dol-
lars,15 or an expenditure of $6-8 billion annually for forty years.16  For every
single site EPA remediates itself, private parties clean up 100 sites.17  Pri-
vate party cost recovery through Superfund is the critical artery that must
support the vital signs of the cost recovery process.
The Supreme Court decision did not control all residual discretion ex-
ercised by the lower courts, though.  Several lower federal courts have cir-
cumvented the core element of the Supreme Court’s decision by re-defining
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See U.S. EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, SUPERFUND BENEFITS ANALYSIS 2005 (2006)
[hereinafter SUPERFUND BENEFITS ANALYSIS], https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/SABPRODUCT
.NSF/58ADDDF28999BAC18525710100554A0F/$File/superfund_sab-adv-06-002.pdf.
14. Id.; see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-ITE-252,
SUPERFUND STRATEGY (U.S. Congress 1985); William Hyatt, CERCLA Contribution; The Con-
fusion Continues, American College of Environmental Lawyers (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www
.acoel.org/post/2014/02/28/CERCLA-Contribution;-The-Confusion-Continues.aspx; Robby
Sanoff, CERCLA’s Confusion Between Section 107 and Section 113, Law & the Environment
(Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.lawandenvironment.com/2015/02/24/cerclas-confusion-between-
section-107-and-section-113/.
15. See U.S. EPA, CLEANING UP THE NATION’S WASTE SITES: MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGY
TRENDS viii (2004).  This lists includes: 125,000 leaking underground storage tanks, 6,400
Department of Defense Facilities, 3,800 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act “Correc-
tive Action” sites, 736 National Priority List Superfund sites, 5,000 Department of Energy
sites, and 150,000 sites that will be addressed by state remediation programs. Id. at 1–5.
16. Id. at viii.
17. Steven Ferrey, Inverting the Law: Superfund Hazardous Waste Liability and Supreme
Court Reversal of All Federal Courts, 33 WM . & MARY ENVTL. L. POL’Y REV. 633, 687 (2009).
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a term that the Supreme Court thought needed no definition.18  The lower
federal courts that did not choose to follow the Atlantic Research decision
have done so by implementing one of three interpretive mechanisms in or-
der to circumvent CERCLA Section 107’s private party cost recovery:
• Defining costs incurred as not “voluntarily” undertaken,19
• disqualifying costs incurred at a point in time after settlement with
EPA,20 or
• reverting to the overturned rationale of choosing a prudential ability
to disqualify claims.21
Each of these three legal mechanisms employs a different theory, but
equally circumvents the Supreme Court’s key decisions on Superfund liabil-
ity.  Section II examines the two relevant cost recovery provisions of the
Superfund statute, focusing on their critical differences.  Section II.C. ana-
lyzes the 2004 and 2007 Supreme Court watershed decisions that over-
turned the federal circuit courts’ holdings that had closed off Section 107
recovery for potentially responsible parties (PRPs).
These two Supreme Court decisions sought to right the listing U.S.
Superfund vessel.  Sections III through V analyze how the lower federal
courts have since circumvented and compromised the Supreme Court’s 2007
decision.22  Section III asks “what’s in a word?”  In particular, some lower
courts have creatively defined the term used by the Supreme Court, “volun-
tarily,” to disqualify a very large portion of the class of private parties for
18. See infra Section III.
19. See id.  This chapter examines how courts have differed on what is or is not “volun-
tarily” undertaking a cleanup and seeking to recover these costs under Section 107, such that
certain courts, but not others, have used this term to circumvent the Supreme Court’s basic
holding.
20. See infra Section IV.  This chapter examines how certain courts, but not others,
have cut off application of the Supreme Court’s basic holding by disqualifying costs incurred
after a private claimant’s settlement with EPA.
21. See infra Section V.  This chapter examines how some courts have reverted to the
rationale prior to the key Supreme Court decision to again assert that a lower court can make
a prudential election to require plaintiffs to only make a claim under Section 113 and not
Section 107 for various, now very suspect, reasons.
22. This article considers the most recent four years when more profound disarray has
occurred.  When the original Atlantic Research opinion was issued, an article tracked its clear
direction. Ferrey, supra note 17, at 633.  The first missteps were tracked. Steven Ferrey, The R
Superfund Cost Allocation Liability Conflicts Among the Federal Courts, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 249
(2009–10) [hereinafter Ferrey, Superfund Cost Allocation Liability Among the Federal Courts].
The confusion in the first 5 years after the Atlantic Research decision was also examined.
Steven Ferrey, Toxic “Plain Meaning” and “Moon-shadow”: Supreme Court Unanimity and Unex-
pected Consequences, 24 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Ferrey, Toxic “Plain Meaning”
and “Moon-shadow”].
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which the Supreme Court reestablished legal cost recovery access in Atlantic
Research.
Section IV analyzes the second mechanism by which some lower federal
courts block the Atlantic Research decision.  Some lower federal courts allow
cost recovery for costs incurred before a settlement with the government,
and disqualify and block costs incurred thereafter.  Other federal courts dis-
agree.  This appears to be a false distinction not embodied in the statute,
based on timing of when the expenditure is made.
Section V examines trial courts and circuit courts that block private
party access to Section 107 Superfund cost recovery, contrary to Atlantic
Research, based on nothing but their own discretion.  Shifting plaintiffs to
Section 113 of the Superfund imposes a much more significant burden and
often no, or at least less, remuneration on good faith plaintiffs than allowing
their use of Section 107.  Notably, in the two 2004 and 2007 Supreme Court
decisions, the Court mandated just the opposite balance, opening up Sec-
tion 107 and restricting Section 113.  This inversion of the law by lower
federal courts, based on judicial discretion, and not the Superfund statute, is
exactly what the Supreme Court thought it had overruled unanimously.
This article analyzes different federal courts’ applications or rejections
of each of these three mechanisms to circumvent the Supreme Court’s At-
lantic Research decision.  Section III, IV, and V compare and contrast ele-
ments of each legal mechanism.  A notable distinction is that one
mechanism operates on the timing of remediation expenditures, another on
how settlors craft their settlements, and the third on the prudential prefer-
ences of certain courts. Each mechanism renders Section 107 of CERCLA
allocation of hazardous substance response costs unavailable to “any . . .
parties” for whom the Supreme Court declared the statute clearly provided
a remedy under the plain meaning of Section 107.  These three mechanisms
circumvent plain meaning and create an inconsistent patchwork of jurispru-
dence in federal courts.  Section VI contrasts and integrates the impacts of
all of the new theories recently created by the lower courts regarding
Superfund cost recovery.  Section II next examines what Superfund does
and does not provide as a matter of statute.
II. SUPERFUND LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA’S UMBRELLA
A. The Federal Statute
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA), commonly known as the “Superfund,” was enacted
by Congress in 1980 to protect public health and the environment from
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\6-1\MEA104.txt unknown Seq: 7 12-MAY-17 12:52
Fall 2016] Superfund Chaos Theory 157
hazardous substances released into the environment.23  Under CERCLA
Sections 104 and 106(a), respectively, the Federal Government is empow-
ered to either clean up a contaminated area itself, or compel the responsible
parties to perform the cleanup.24  Under either circumstance, the cost in-
curred during the cleanup process will be recoverable by the EPA from
potentially responsible parties (PRPs) under Section 107 of the statute in a
cost-recovery action brought by the U.S. government.25  Section
9607(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA makes all PRPs liable for “any . . . necessary
costs of response incurred by any other person.”26
The language in Section 107 does not clearly state whether a private
party may seek cost recovery against other private or government PRPs,
after it is found liable under CERCLA.27 Yet, before Congress passed the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), courts
consistently held that a PRP could sue another private party PRP under
Section 107(a)(4)(B) for either cost-recovery or contribution.28  In SARA,
Congress amended CERCLA Section 113 to mirror Section 107, and codi-
fied the federal courts’ interpretations.29  SARA expressly grants private
parties the right to seek cost contribution during or after a cost recovery or
EPA judicial enforcement action, or after settling its CERCLA liability
with the United States or a state “in an administrative or judicially approved
settlement.”30  Given the strict liability imposed by CERCLA for cost re-
23. U.S. EPA, Superfund History, EPA.GOV, https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-
history (last visited Aug. 27, 2016).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606(a) (2014).  These sections provide a framework for the
President, his or her delegated agent, EPA, or Attorney General to initiate “federal abate-
ment and enforcement actions” against private responsible parties. See Key Tronic Corp. v.
United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994) (explaining in general relevant parties’ rights and
responsibilities under CERCLA provisions).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).  The statute provides that “any person who accepts or
accepted any hazardous substances . . . shall be liable for any other necessary costs of re-
sponse incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan.” Id.
Using the plain language approach in interpreting the statute, the courts held that PRPs are
“any other person” who can recover liability costs under Section 107(a)(4)(B). See Ferrey,
supra note 17, at 639–40 (noting Section 107(a) did not clearly define whether or not PRPs R
can recover under this section); see also Ronald G. Aronovsky, A Preemption Paradox: Preserv-
ing The Role Of State Law In Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 240
(2008) (noting before Section 113 passed, courts allowed PRPs using Section 107 to recover
against other PRPs); Steven Ferrey, Allocation & Uncertainty in the Age of Superfund: A Cri-
tique of the Redistribution of CERCLA Liability, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 36, 59 (1994) (arguing for
infusion of common law equity principles despite explicit exclusion in language of statute).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1), (f)(3)(B).
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covery and the limited resources of both private parties and the government
for prosecutions, settlement of liability is often the most expeditious
solution.31
To encourage liability settlement with the federal government, Section
113(f)(2) also provides a liability shield against contribution claims regard-
ing the same matter addressed in the settlement agreement.32  So, once a
party settles through an approved settlement with the government, it insu-
lates itself: (1) from future suit by either the federal or state governments;
and (2) from suit by other private parties, directly or in counterclaims.
These are important shields, and lawyers would counsel their clients to ob-
tain this protection before seeking contribution from other private parties.
This protection would immunize their clients against any counterclaims
raised by the parties sued.
B. Section 107 Liability is Not Section 113 Liability
Before 2004, parties were fighting over whether Section 107 or the new
Section 113 contribution right, added to CERCLA in 1986 amendments,
should be used to allocate liabilities among PRPs.33  Plaintiffs favored Sec-
tion 107 because where the harm cannot be proved to be divisible, it can
impose joint and several liability on defendants.34  Joint and several liabil-
ity, when applicable, strictly imposes 100% of total waste site cleanup liabil-
ity on any and all PRPs who are successfully sued.35  A settling PRP also
strategically can choose which and how many non-settling defendants to sue
as a private party under Section 107.36  It is much easier for a plaintiff to
prove damages against a lesser number of defendants than bearing the bur-
den of proof severally against every one of often thousands of non-settling
PRPs.37
31. See generally Superfund Cleanup Activities: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on
Superfund, Waste Control and Risk Assessment (statement of Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Att’y
Gen., Env’t and Nat. Res. Div, Dep’t of Justice, Mar. 21, 2000), https://www.justice.gov/
archive/enrd/59380.htm.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
33. See Aronovsky, supra note 28, at 242–43. R
34. Id. at 239 n.72.
35. See Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute, Joint and Several
Liability, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/joint_and_several_liability (last visited Oct. 1,
2016) (“When two or more parties are jointly and severally liable for a tortious act, each party
is independently liable for the full extent of the injuries stemming from the tortious act.
Thus, if a plaintiff wins a money judgment against the parties collectively, the plaintiff may
collect the full value of the judgment from any one of them. That party may then seek
contribution from the other wrong-doers.”).
36. STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATION 454 (7th ed. 2016).
37. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\6-1\MEA104.txt unknown Seq: 9 12-MAY-17 12:52
Fall 2016] Superfund Chaos Theory 159
The defendant, in contrast, favored Section 113 of CERCLA because it
only imposes several liability on PRP defendants.38  Under Section
113(f)(1) the courts have allocated response costs among responsible parties
using equitable factors that they deem appropriate.39  Yet under Section
113(f), plaintiffs must prove the proportionate share of liability and costs for
each and every defendant severally.40  Furthermore, liability is never com-
pletely shifted from the PRP plaintiff; rather, the plaintiff retains its equita-
ble share of the cleanup costs, as well as the share of any PRP against whom
the plaintiff cannot sustain its burden.41  As proving apportionment of all
liability is challenging, the plaintiff often absorbs significant ‘orphan
shares’ of liability.42
If liability under Section 113(f) is merely several regarding an individ-
ual defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden to prove the proportionate
share of liability for each and every defendant.43  CERCLA Sections 107
and 113 are not similar legal mechanisms.  They provide fundamentally op-
posed and different types of liability, statutes of limitations, and require-
ments of proof, all of which change case outcomes.44
Section 107 is preferable to Section 113 for most plaintiffs due to the
availability of joint and several liability, a doubly long statute of limitations
period compared to Section 113,45 the necessity only to name and prosecute
a few and not all liable parties, and traditionally the unavailability of equita-
ble defenses to defendants (beyond the statutorily prescribed defenses).46
In addition, there is no express statutory prohibition against equitable con-
siderations applied to claims adjudicated under Section 107.47  Finally, Sec-
38. Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2014); e.g., Durham Mfg. Co. v. Merriam Mfg. Co., 294
F. Supp. 2d 251, 264 (D. Conn. 2003) (citing Goodrich Corp. v. Town of Middlebury, 311
F.3d 154, 168 (2d Cir. 2002)).
40. See Ferrey, supra note 17, at 641. R
41. Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1998).
42. Ferry, supra note 17, at 657. R
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (delineating contribution among responsible parties).
44. FERREY, supra note 36, at 454. R
45. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9607, with 42 U.S.C. § 9613.
46. See FERREY, supra note 36, at 453–56 (noting differences between Sections 107 and R
113).
47. See United States v. Hardage, 116 F.R.D. 460, 465 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (allowing
equitable factors raised as defense to bar government’s Section 107 claims).  This opinion,
however, is not followed by many other courts. E.g. United States v. NCR Corp., No. 10-C-
910, 2012 WL 5831201, at *2 (E.D. Wisc. Nov. 16, 2012) (“[T]he case is from the Jurassic
period (in CERCLA years) and has not been followed elsewhere.”); United States v. Webzeb
Enterprises, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 646, 658 n.18 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
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tion 107 is less likely to result in the plaintiff absorbing “orphan shares” of
unfunded PRP liability.48
What both CERCLA Sections 107 and 113 share, if used offensively by
a party after it settles its liability with the government, is an automatic
shield against claims or counterclaims by other private parties or the gov-
ernment.49  Congress provided protection from additional future liability to
all settling PRPs in a judicially- or administratively-approved settlement.50
This protection extends to future actions prosecuted by both private PRPs
and the government, but only for matters covered by the settlement pursu-
ant to Section 113(f)(2).51  Contribution protection is effective as soon as a
settlement is signed, and it is not dependent on the fulfillment of any duties
undertaken by the settlor.52  A settlement with the government confers ab-
solute protection against counterclaims by non-settling defendants,53
whether or not this optional provision is inserted in a consent decree.54  In
order to ensure this protection, however, the settling PRP must settle via a
consent decree, as opposed to responding to a unilateral administrative or-
der from EPA under Section 106.55  This distinction is critical, as plaintiffs
must first be sued in order to use Section 113, something Section 107 does
not require.
48. See FERREY, supra note 36, at 448–49 (providing example of orphan share R
allocation).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
50. Id.
51. Id.  “A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an
administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for claims for contribution
regarding matters addressed in the settlement.” Id.  This applies to any settlement of any
kind of government claim. Id.  Invariably, EPA brings Section 107 claims because it has
incurred response costs, and does not bring Section 113 claims, and this is the claim that
PRPs settle with the government. FERREY, supra note 36, at 421–22.  Since other PRPs who R
do not expend money for cleanup only have a Section 113 contribution claim and not a
Section 107 response cost claim, Section 107(f) blocks any claim of the other PRPs against
the settling party. Id. at 459–60 (explanation 2a).
52. Dravo Corp. v. Zuber, 13 F.3d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that, pursuant
to Section 122(a), de minimis settlors receive automatic and instantaneous contribution pro-
tection subject to a condition subsequent to fulfill duties).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
54. Id.  This contribution protection occurs when a settlement is either judicially or
administratively approved.  Some precedent holds that this protection operates as a complete
bar to its contribution claims. See, e.g., Comercia Bank-Detroit v. Allen Indus., 769 F. Supp.
1408, 1413–14 (E.D. Mich. 1991); United States v. Pretty Prods., 780 F. Supp. 1488,
1493–94 (S.D. Ohio 1991); Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730 F. Supp. 626, 639 (D.N.J. 1990);
United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 675 (D.N.J. 1989).  Under this
theory, such protection could not be waived by the beneficiary of the protection.
55. See Dravo, 13 F.3d at 1225–28.
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Therefore, no prudent PRP would spend large amounts of money be-
yond its own share of responsibility to clean up a third-party site.  Without
a prior or simultaneous settlement with the government to bar all future
government or third-party claims, a private party has not screened itself off
from future litigation or counterclaims in its own litigation.56  Section 113,
while available, may be of limited use if the statute of limitations accompa-
nying Section 113 has expired, there was no prior litigation and settlement
with the government, or that litigation and settlement is not with an appro-
priate level of government.57
C. The Evolution of Precedent
Prior to 1994, none of the circuit courts had directly addressed the issue
of whether a PRP had standing under Section 107 to recover cleanup costs,
and the Supreme Court had only touched upon the question as a back-
ground issue.58  District courts split on whether a PRP could elect between
a Section 107 and a Section 113 claim.59  More than a dozen primarily trial
court decisions found no legislative barrier to a Section 107 action by pri-
vate plaintiff parties.60  The author published an article in 1994 that con-
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (providing contribution protection to private parties
who settle with government).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613.
58. See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994) (not answering the
question of whether only “innocent” parties had standing under Section 107 cost-recovery
claims; rather, merely holding that Section 107 did not provide for the award of attorney’s
fees).
59. For examples of district courts that had allowed PRPs to raise a Section 107 claim,
see Cos. for Fair Allocation v. Axil Corp., 853 F. Supp. 575, 579 (D. Conn. 1994); United
States v. SCA Servs. of Ind., Inc., 849 F. Supp. 1264, 1270 (N.D. Ind. 1994); Transp.
Leasing Co. v. California, 861 F. Supp. 931, 937–38 (C.D. Cal. 1993).  For examples of
district courts that have held that PRPs may not use Section 107 to recover response costs,
see SC Holdings, Inc. v. A.A.A. Realty Co., 935 F. Supp. 1354, 1362–65 (D.N.J. 1996);
Kaufman v. Unisys Corp., 868 F. Supp. 1212, 1214–16 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
60. E.g., Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 748 (7th Cir. 1993) (af-
firming Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 36 ERC 1355 (N.D. Ind. 1992)); General
Electric Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990); Barmet Alu-
minum Corp. v. Doug Brantley & Sons, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 159 (W.D. Ky. 1995); Bethlehem
Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., 891 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. Pa. 1995); United States v. Atlas
Minerals & Chems., Civ. A. No. 91-5118, 1995 WL 510304 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1995); Walkill
v. Tesa Tape Inc., 891 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); SCA Servs., 865 F. Supp. 533; Cos. for
Fair Allocation, 853 F. Supp. at 579–80; Oshtemo v. American Cyanamid Co., No.
1:92:CV:843, 1993 WL 561814, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 1993); Barton Solvents, Inc. v.
Sw. Petro-Chem, Inc., Civ. A. No. 91-2382-GTV, 1993 WL 382047, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 14,
1993); Transp. Leasing, 861 F. Supp. at 938; Virginia v. Peck Iron Metal Co., 814 F. Supp.
1269 (E.D. Va. 1992); United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 413–14 (D.N.J. 1991) (no
distinction between government or “any other person” employing Section 107 for cost recov-
ery); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 790 F. Supp. 710, 717 (W.D. Mich. 1990); United
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cluded that the legally correct interpretation of CERCLA by appellate
courts going forward was that Section 107 was available to all private
parties.61
That article did not sway the appellate courts.  Beginning in 1994 there
began a decade of cascading federal circuit opinions, each in essence con-
cluding that when Congress stated “every other person” could use Section
107, it actually meant that “no other person” could use Section 107.  During
the next decade, each of the eleven federal circuits (excluding the D.C.
Circuit, which did not hear a case with this dispute), barred most plaintiffs
from using CERCLA’s Section 107 cost recovery mechanism: the Seventh62
(July 1994), the First63 (Aug. 1994), the Tenth64 (Mar. 1995), the Elev-
enth65 (Sept. 1996), the Third66 (May 1997), the Ninth67 (July 1997), the
States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460, 1495 (W.D. Okla. 1990); Allied Corp. v. Acme Sol-
vents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100, 1119 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Sand Springs Home v.
Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913, 915–16 (N.D. Okla. 1987); United States v. Hardage,
116 F.R.D. 460 (W.D. Okla. 1987).
61. Ferrey, supra note 28. R
62. Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 770 (7th Cir. 1994) (limiting
plaintiff’s right of contribution).
63. United Tech. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 103 (1st Cir. 1994)
(holding claim for contribution barred by statute of limitations).
64. United States v. Colo. & E.R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995) (denying
plaintiffs ability to proceed under Section 107 and finding claim instead controlled by Sec-
tion 113(f)).
65. Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1514 (11th Cir. 1996)
(limiting right of contribution under Section 107).
66. New Castle Cty. v. Halliburton Nus Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1126 (3d Cir. 1997)
(denying plaintiff’s cost recovery claim under Section 107 because plaintiff was potentially
responsible person).
67. Pinal Creek Grp. v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1299–1301 (9th Cir.
1997) (focusing only on ordinary meaning of term “contribution” in Section 113); see also
Pinal Creek Grp. v. Newmont Mining Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1400, 1410 (D. Ariz. 1996)
(denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s cost recovery claim be-
cause plaintiff asserted sufficient allegations that defendant exercised “owner operator” liabil-
ity); Adhesives Research v. Am. Inks & Coatings, 931 F. Supp. 1231, 1243–44 (M.D. Pa.
1996).
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Fifth68 (Aug. 1997), the Fourth69 (Apr. 1998), the Sixth70 (Aug. 1998), the
Second71 (Sept. 1998), and the Eighth (Aug. 2003).72
Thus, notwithstanding the author’s law review article at NYU in 2004
cautioning that PRPs could employ Section 107 of CERCLA for private
cost recovery actions,73 the Federal Courts of Appeals uniformly barred Sec-
tion 107 cost recovery by private parties.74  To do so, in effect, they had to
conclude that when Congress stated “every other person”75 could use Sec-
tion 107, it actually did not mean to say this.
Many of the federal circuit opinions overruled their trial courts to ar-
rive at restrictive statutory interpretations regarding the federal structure of
incentives for private hazardous substance cleanup.76  These eleven circuit
court opinions closed off the primary path to share or allocate hazardous
waste cleanup costs, without any compelling legislative history, contrary to
the principles articulated in all other federal hazardous waste jurisprudence,
and contrary to the accepted canons of statutory construction.77
1. Cooper v. Aviall
The Supreme Court finally had a CERCLA private cost recovery dis-
pute to settle in 2004.  In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.,78 the
Supreme Court held that a private party cannot initiate a claim under Sec-
tion 113(f)(1) against other PRPs for contribution of their share of hazard-
68. OHM Remediation Serv. v. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc., 116 F.3d 1574, 1583 (5th
Cir. 1997) (noting issues of fact need to be remanded in order to determine viability of
Section 107 claim).
69. Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R. Co., 142 F.3d
769, 776 (4th Cir. 1998) (discussing validity of Section 107 claim and allocation of responsi-
bility and costs).
70. Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 356 (6th
Cir. 1998) (barring cost recovery claim and limiting right of contribution under Section
113(f)).
71. Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1998) (preventing plaintiff
from bringing Section 107 claim and forcing plaintiff to proceed under Section 113(f)).
72. Dico, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 340 F.3d 525, 531–32 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding plain-
tiff could not bring action against customer group for cost recovery unless it could establish
defense set forth in Section 107(b)).
73. Ferrey, supra note 28. R
74. See supra notes 62–72; FERREY, supra note 36, at 437. R
75. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2014).
76. See, e.g., Pinal Creek Grp. v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir.
1997) (overruling OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc. 116 F.3d 1574
(5th Cir. 1997)).
77. See generally LARRY M. EIG & CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GEN-
ERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS (2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf.; Fer-
rey, supra note 17, at 639–40, 710–15. R
78. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
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ous waste cleanup costs, unless and until that plaintiff itself had been sued
by or settled with the government under Section 107(a) or Section 106 of
CERCLA.79  The two dissenters in this decision sought to go further in the
opinion and address whether there was a private right to cost recovery
under Section 107(a); Justice Ginsberg, joined by Justice Stevens, would
have ruled on the Section 107 issue notwithstanding it not being briefed to
the Court.80  However, because Cooper had been forced to drop its alterna-
tive Section 107 claim after the initiation of litigation, the issue was neither
briefed nor addressed in the circuit court opinion on review, and therefore,
was not before the Court.81  This decision cut off Section 113 as an effective
cost reallocation route where there had not been prior litigation with the
government or where there was an EPA administrative order rather than
litigation.
Eliminating one of two routes to share cost responsibility for hazardous
waste cleanup caused a nationwide crisis, especially because eleven federal
circuits had previously cordoned off the only other recovery route, Section
107.82  The combination of Cooper v. Aviall and eleven circuits closing off
Section 107 recovery paralyzed the nation’s hazardous waste cleanup
effort.83
After Cooper the Second and Eighth Circuits reversed their prior hold-
ings, and reopened Section 107 to PRPs.84  It appears the hope was to break
gridlock, and encourage voluntary hazardous waste remediation.  But other
circuits continued to hold that PRPs could not recover cleanup costs under
79. Id. at 166–67.  The only two dissenters in this decision, Justices Ginsburg and
Stevens, did not oppose the core outcome of the case, but rather they intended to go further
with a discussion of whether or not the private parties can recover under Section 107 before
found liable under CERCLA. See id. at 172–74 (urging the Fifth Circuit to reconsider appli-
cability of Section 107).
80. Id. at 172.  Justice Ginsburg’s dissent notes that in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,
511 U.S. 809 (1994), the Supreme Court in dicta stated that Section 107 “unquestionably
provides a cause of action for [PRPs].” Id. at 172.  Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissenting in
Key Tronic, but in the majority in Cooper, also favored a private right of action under Section
107.  Justice Ginsberg noted that in Key Tronic “no Justice expressed the slightest doubt that
§ 107 indeed enables a PRP to sue other covered persons for reimbursement . . . of cleanup
costs.” Id.
81. Id. at 174 (following plain meaning of Section 113 language).
82. See supra notes 62–72. R
83. See Ferrey, supra note 17, at 636 (“The decisions of these circuit courts paralyzed R
hazardous waste clean-up across the nation.”).
84. See Ferrey, The Superfund Cost Allocation Liability Conflicts Among the Federal Courts,
supra note 22, at 267–70 (noting the Second and Eighth Circuit Courts’ “U-turn” after the R
Cooper decision).
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Section 107.85  Nonetheless, these two circuit court reversals created a cir-
cuit split that the Supreme Court could resolve.
2. Atlantic Research
In 2007, the Supreme Court did resolve CERCLA liability allocation
among PRPs in Atlantic Research.86  Using the plain language of Section 107,
the Supreme Court reversed the original decisions of all eleven circuits’
previous decisions and reopened Section 107 to PRPs.87  The Court also
addressed key distinctions on the use of both provisions.  Although Sections
107 and 113 are complementary, for a PRP who incurred costs to satisfy a
settlement agreement with the government or a court judgment, Section 113
will be the exclusive remedy.88  Section 107 will be the exclusive remedy for
a PRP who voluntarily incurred cleanup costs.89
The Supreme Court’s decision in Atlantic Research, clarified that “any
. . . person” voluntarily incurring remediation costs is entitled to utilize the
Superfund’s Section 107 cost recovery mechanism, did not define the critical
issue of what was a “voluntary” expenditure.90  The Supreme Court also
clarified that “a PRP that pays money to satisfy a settlement agreement or a
court judgment may pursue § 113(f) contribution. But by reimbursing re-
sponse costs paid by other parties, the PRP has not incurred its own costs of
response and therefore cannot recover under § 107(a).”91  The Supreme
Court noted that voluntarily incurred costs may only be allocated by re-
course to Section 107; however, the line between what is and is not volun-
tary was not defined.92
And this lack of definition of a common term would render the Court’s
decision subject to lower federal court inconsistency and fundamentally dif-
85. See id. at 270–71 (noting some circuits followed the Third and Fifth Circuits’ opin-
ions and held that Section 107 was not available to PRPs).
86. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007) (affirming a 2006 post-
Aviall opinion of the 8th Circuit, Atl. Research v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 459 F.3d 827 (8th Cir.
2006), which had reversed itself to open up private PRP access to Section 107 cost recovery).
87. See Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 135–36 (holding “any other person” in Section
107(a)(4)(B) meant to include any other persons who are not the United States, a State, or
an Indian tribe).  The court also noted that Sections 107 and 113 provide two distinctive
remedies: Section 107 provides cost recovery to a PRP to recover cleanup costs, and Section
113 “authorizes a contribution action to PRPs with common liability stemming from an ac-
tion instituted under § 106 or § 107(a).” Id. at 139–40.
88. Id. at 139.
89. Id. at 139 n.6.
90. Id. at 132.
91. Id. at 139 (describing allocation of costs sought to be paid under Section 107).
92. Id. at 141 (affirming lower court decision in line with author’s opinion which did
not define the term “voluntarily”).
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ferent interpretation.  While many circuits did show clear movement in re-
sponse to the Cooper and Atlantic Research opinions, some circuits struggled
with whether or not “voluntary” cleanup included remediation after enter-
ing a consent decree with the government.93
“Voluntary” has proven to not be a commonly understood word.94
D. Recent Vectors of Judicial Interpretation
Although some courts initially continued to prevent Section 107 cost
recovery remedies for private PRPs despite the ruling in Atlantic Research,95
some courts in the past four years have been more supportive of private
party access to Section 107 cost recovery.96  In determining whether cost
recovery or contribution applies, courts have sorted through different fac-
tors, none of which were required to be considered by the Supreme Court
decision in Atlantic Research:
• The “voluntary” nature of the costs incurred;97
• whether the parties had entered into a settlement or consent decree
with state or federal governments, which some courts deem to affect
the “involuntariness” of the future cleanup; however, prior litigation
is the necessary statutory trigger for private party Section 113 con-
tribution claims after the Cooper decision;98 and
93. Compare ITT Indus., Inc. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 640, 646–48 (W.D.
Mich. 2009) (holding that a plaintiff who was required to pay cleanup costs pursuant to
consent decree could not bring a cost recovery claim), and Appleton Papers Inc. v. George A.
Whiting Paper Co., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1042–43 (E.D. Wisc. 2008) (holding cleanup
costs incurred pursuant to a consent decree were not incurred voluntarily), and Reichhold,
Inc. v. U.S. Metals Refining Co., Civ. No. 03-453 (DRD), 2008 WL 5046780, at *7 (D.N.J.
Nov. 20, 2008) (interpreting “voluntary” as having responded to no litigation or order on the
record), and Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 398, 401
(N.D.N.Y 2006) (holding plaintiff who entered consent decree could not bring Section 107
claim), with Schaefer v. Town of Victor, 457 F.3d 188, 201–02 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that
Section 107 is available to parties who conducted cleanup pursuant to consent decrees).
94. See infra Section II.D.
95. Ferrey, Toxic “Plain Meaning” and “Moon-shadow,” supra note 22, at 2. R
96. See infra Sections IV.A.1–B.1, V.A.1–V.B.1.
97. See, e.g., Litgo N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 725 F.3d 369, 392
(3d Cir. 2013); Bernstein v. Bankert, 702 F.3d 964, 981–84 (7th Cir. 2012), amended on reh’g,
733 F.3d 190 (7th Cir. 2013); LWD PRP Grp. v. ACF Indus., LLC, No. 5:12-CV-00127-
JHM, 2014 WL 901648, at *6 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 7, 2014); United States v. D.S.C. of Newark
Enters., Inc., No. 09-2270 (MLC), 2013 WL 2658929, at *19–21 (D.N.J. June 12, 2013);
Queens W. Dev. Corp. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 10-4876, 2011 WL 3625137, at *8–11
(D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2011).
98. See, e.g., Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 136 (3d
Cir. 2013); Bernstein, 702 F.3d 964; Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1235–37
(11th Cir. 2012); Morrison Enters., LLC v. Dravo Corp., 638 F.3d 594, 599 (8th Cir. 2011);
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• the nature of the contemplated remedies and liabilities imposed by
the two CERCLA sections – possibility of joint and several, strict
liability under Section 107 cost recovery contrasted with the ability
to apportion costs under Section 113 contribution.99
While some courts examined all three of these issues to reach their
decisions, others focused on a single issue regarding the applicability of the
different CERCLA remedies.  Since Cooper, there must be a civil action
against a private PRP for it to initiate a Section 113 contribution action
against other parties, so as to spread its cleanup liability.100  Federal courts
are split on whether an administrative order on consent (AOC) entered by
the government with a private party allows a private plaintiff to use Section
113 contribution actions against other liable parties.101  Unilateral adminis-
trative orders can qualify as civil actions to satisfy the prerequisite for a
PRP’s contribution claim under Section 113(f)(1) in some courts; however,
the majority of decisions hold that an AOC does not qualify as it is not the
result of a “civil action.”102  Under this rationale, an AOC is only a pre-
litigation agency resolution or settlement; it does not settle a contested ad-
judicatory proceeding.
This article next analyzes each of these three considerations individu-
ally, segregating the district court and appellate decisions that addressed
each issue, and examining how courts facing similar facts reached different
outcomes.
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos Int’l, Inc., 559 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2009); Ford Motor Co. v. Mich.
Consol. Gas Co., 993 F. Supp. 2d 693, 697 (E.D. Mich. 2014); Carolina Power & Lighting
Co. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., No. 5:08-CV-460, 2013 WL 1246833, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Mar.
27, 2013); Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. v. TCI Pac. Commc’ns, Inc., No. 11-CV-0252-JED-
PJC, 2013 WL 6238485 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 3, 2013); BFI Waste Sys. v. City of Belvidere,
No. 09 C 50061, 2011 WL 9105930, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2011).
99. NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682, 690 (7th Cir. 2014);
Solutia, 672 F.3d at 1235–37; Whittaker Corp. v. United States, No. CV 13-1741 FMO
(JCx), 2014 WL 631113, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2014); Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of
Ohio, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1093 (S.D. Ohio 2013); Tennessee v. Roan Holdings,
Ltd., 835 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Tenn. 2011).
100. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 165–66 (2004).
101. See, e.g., Bernstein, 702 F.3d at 981–84, amended on reh’g, 733 F.3d 190 (7th Cir.
2013); Centerior Serv. Co. v. ACME Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 351–52 (6th
Cir. 1998) (holding that potentially responsible parties could not bring joint and several cost
recovery action, but were restricted to action for contribution); LWD PRP Grp., 2014 WL
901648, at *6; Carrier Corp. v. Piper, 460 F. Supp. 2d 827, 840–41 (W.D. Tenn. 2006)
(holding that unilateral administrative orders can qualify as civil actions).
102. See, e.g., Carrier Corp., 460 F. Supp. at 840–41 (holding that unilateral administra-
tive orders can qualify as civil actions); see also Centerior Serv., 153 F.3d at 351–52 (holding
that potentially responsible parties could not bring joint and several cost recovery action, but
were restricted to action for contribution).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\6-1\MEA104.txt unknown Seq: 18 12-MAY-17 12:52
168 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 6:1
III. THE “VOLUNTARY” NATURE OF PLAINTIFFS’ COST INCURSION:
A NEW META SCREEN
A. In the Federal Appellate Courts
Clearly, some of the eleven courts of appeals whose CERCLA decisions
were overturned by Atlantic Research did not want to follow the Supreme
Court command to open up Section 107 cost recovery actions to private
parties.  One way to circumvent Atlantic Research would be to seize upon an
undefined term in the Court’s opinion; namely, whether costs were “volun-
tarily” incurred.
Following Atlantic Research, several federal appellate courts have empha-
sized the ‘voluntariness’ of incurred costs when tasked with determining
whether a party may pursue Section 107 cost recovery, Section 113 contribu-
tion, both, or neither.  Although the word “voluntary” appears nowhere in
the text of either Sections 107 and 113,103 it has become a lynchpin in circuit
court arguments that favor preclusion of Section 107 for private parties’ cost
recovery claims.  How a court determines whether actions are voluntary
after a party enters a protective settlement with the government (in order to
obtain contribution protection) can present a problem for PRPs pursuing
Section 107 cost recovery claims.  The common-sense settlement approach
can end up eliminating access to Section 107 cost recovery in some, though
not all, circuits.
Of the many lower federal court cases that have followed and cited the
Atlantic Research Supreme Court decision, the Seventh Circuit decision in
Bernstein v. Bankert is one of the more cogent in clarifying when private
party cleanup costs are “voluntary” versus “compulsory.”104  In this case, the
plaintiff, a trustee of a trust formed to fund the cleanup of a CERCLA site
originally sought Section 107 cost recovery from the defendant owners of
the site (who owed money to the trust).105  Defendant had previously en-
tered into two AOCs with the EPA and the state environmental agency.106
Although the district court ruled that the trustee’s only available remedy
was for contribution under Section 113 because of these settlement agree-
ments, the federal appeals court disagreed.107
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607, 9613 (2014).
104. Bernstein v. Bankert, 702 F.3d 964, 981–84 (7th Cir. 2012), amended on reh’g, 733
F.3d 190 (7th Cir. 2013).
105. Id. at 969.
106. Id. at 970.  The trustee claimed both contribution and cost recovery remedies under
both CERCLA and the state environmental statute after the trust had entered into two
separate consent decrees, one in 1999 that had been fully complied with and completed and
another in 2002 which had not yet been completed. Id. at 970–71.
107. Id. at 977–78.
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The court explained that the defendants had misinterpreted Atlantic Re-
search with respect to “voluntarily” incurred costs compared to “compulsory”
costs incurred by the plaintiff PRP.108  The defendant’s contention that
Section 107 claims can only apply to voluntarily incurred costs “impos[es] a
requirement not evident on the face of the statute” and “arguably violates
fundamental rules of statutory construction.”109
The default position of the Court in Atlantic Research was that Section
107 was reopened for private party cost recovery.110 Bernstein implies that
Atlantic Research wanted to clarify that claims for costs voluntarily incurred
cannot be brought as contribution claims under Section 113, as per Cooper,
which requires prior compulsion by suit.111  Rather, such voluntarily in-
curred costs are only recoverable through cost recovery claims under Sec-
tion 107.112  This is different than interpreting the Supreme Court’s
language as going a step further to imply that claims for voluntarily in-
curred costs with no private government settlement are covered by Section
107’s cost recovery remedy.
Other courts have found that directly paying remediation expenditures
makes them  “voluntarily” incurred expenditures, allowing private party ac-
cess to Section 107.  Courts in the Third Circuit have found many PRP
cleanup actions to be “voluntary,” and therefore entitled to use Section 107
cost recovery.113  In Litgo N.J., Inc. v. Commissioner New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reaffirmed that Sections 107 and 113 are procedurally distinctive
remedies not uniformly available to all claimants.114  Relying on Atlantic
Research, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to bring a lawsuit to
recover its response costs against the defendants under Section 107.115  The
court came to this outcome because the plaintiffs bore the costs of remedia-
tion when it hired environmental consultants to carry out cleanup plans
without any imposed CERCLA liabilities.116
108. Id. at 969–72.
109. Id. at 983 (citing E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. v. United States, 508 F.3d 126,
133 n.5 (3d Cir. 2007)).
110. See United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 511 U.S. 128 (2007).
111. See Bernstein, 702 F.3d at 981.
112. Id. at 982.
113. See, e.g., Litgo N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 725 F.3d 369, 392
(3d Cir. 2013); United States v. D.S.C. of Newark Enters., Inc., No. 09-2270 (MLC), 2013
WL 2658929, at *5–6 (D.N.J. June 12, 2013); Queens W. Dev. Corp. v. Honeywell Int’l,
Inc., No. 10-4876, 2011 WL 3625137, at *2–4 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2011).
114. Litgo, 725 F.3d at 392.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 391–92.
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After the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed its previous holdings denying private party access to Section 107,
which it had held prior to Atlantic Research, one of that circuit’s district
courts disagreed. In Chartis Specialty Insurance Co. v. United States117 a dis-
trict court expressly reaffirmed that a PRP can initiate suit pursuant to
Section 107 if it incurred cleanup costs voluntarily, and that Section 107
imposes joint and several liability against the defendant.118  The court also
closely followed the holding in Atlantic Research, and rejected the defen-
dant’s arguments that joint and several liability will help a PRP escape
CERCLA liability, or that it is unfair to shift the burden to prove appor-
tionment to the defendant.119
Finally, in 2014, the Fourth Circuit, in Madison University Mall LLC v.
Chapel Hill Tire Co., relied on Cooper and Atlantic Research to point out the
gap created between the holdings of these two Supreme Court cases.120
Certain costs, such as those incurred pursuant to consent decrees, are not
“voluntary” but also are not reimbursing the costs of another party.121  If
there is no prior suit, some other courts have denied access to both Section
113, and if not voluntary, to Section 107 cost recovery.122
B. In the Federal District Courts
The lower federal courts are split on this “voluntary” question.  The
Western District of Kentucky was reluctant to shut out a PRP’s Section 107
cost recovery remedy in a 2014 decision regarding the cleanup of an inciner-
ation site in Calvert City, Kentucky.123  In LWD PRP Group v. ACF Indus-
tries, LLC, the EPA’s Emergency Response and Removal Branch (ERRB)
began cleanup of the LWD incinerator site and entered into an Agreement
and Order on Consent for Removal Action (Removal Action AOC) with a
number of PRPs, including the plaintiffs.124  The LWD PRP group claimed
to have paid over $9.5 million in response costs, some of which was volunta-
117. Chartis Specialty Ins. Co. v. United States, No. C-13-1527 EMC, 2013 WL
3803334, at *17–18 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2013).
118. Id.
119. Id. at *18.
120. See Madison Univ. Mall v. Chapel Hill Tire Co., No. 1:14-CV-169, 2014 WL
3696263 (M.D.N.C. July 23, 2014).
121. Id. at *2.
122. See, e.g., Litgo N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 725 F.3d 369, 392
(3d Cir. 2013); LWD PRP Grp. v. ACF Indus., LLC, No. 5:12-CV-00127-JHM, 2014 WL
901648 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 7, 2014); MPM Silicones, LLC v. Union Carbide, 931 F. Supp. 2d
387, 395–96 (N.D.N.Y. 2013).
123. LWD PRP Grp. v. ACF Indus., LLC, No. 5:12-CV-00127-JHM, 2014 WL 901648,
at *6 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 7, 2014) (denying motion to dismiss, granting leave to amend).
124. Id. at *1.
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rily incurred while they were negotiating with the Kentucky Department of
Environmental Protection (KDEP) and before the agreement was final-
ized.125  Plaintiff’s grievances derived from two “Settlement Agreement[s]
for Recovery of Past Response Costs” agreements entered with the EPA, as
well as voluntary response costs regarding activities encouraged by the Ken-
tucky Department of Environmental Protection at the LWD Incinerator
Site.126
Although the court found that the LWD PRP group failed to specify
what costs were incurred voluntarily and which costs were related to the
AOC entered with the EPA, it would not dismiss the case, and allowed the
plaintiffs to amend their complaint to specify the origin of the costs.127  In
2015, plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint was dismissed by the Western
District Court of Kentucky pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), as a portion of the costs under the plaintiff’s Third Amended
Complaint were time-barred.128  In assessing these clams, the court deter-
mined that the recent Sixth Circuit decision in Hobart Corp. v. Waste Man-
agement was controlling.129  Based on these factors, the court determined
that the statute of limitations for an action of contribution expired three
years after the effective date of the settlement agreement pursuant to Sec-
125. Id. at *5 (quoting United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 139 n.6
(2007) (“We do not suggest that §§ 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f) have no overlap at all. For in-
stance, we recognize that a PRP may sustain expenses pursuant to a consent decree following
a suit under § 106 or § 107(a). In such a case, the PRP does not incur costs voluntarily but
does not reimburse the costs of another party. We do not decide whether these compelled
costs of response are recoverable under § 113(f), § 107(a), or both. For our purposes, it suf-
fices to demonstrate that costs incurred voluntarily are recoverable only by way of
§ 107(a)(4)(B), and costs of reimbursement to another person pursuant to a legal judgment
or settlement are recoverable only under § 113(f).”)).
126. Id. Compl. 9.
127. LWD PRP Grp., 2014 WL 901648, at *6.
128. LWD PRP Grp. v. ACF Indus. LLC, No. 5:12-CV-00127-GNS-HBB, 2015 WL
1143019, at *14 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 12, 2015).  Specifically, defendants alleged that the contribu-
tion claim, at least insofar as the payment made by plaintiff to the EPA under one of the
agreements reached between plaintiffs and the EPA, was barred by CERCLA Section
113(b). Id. at *8.
129. Id. at *12; see also Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, 758 F.3d 757, 768 (6th
Cir. 2014) (delineating a four factor test).  The first factor was the requirement that the
party “ha[s] resolved [its] liability.” Id.  The second factor was that the ASAOC stated that
the parties “agree[d] that [the ASAOC] constitute[d] an administrative settlement for pur-
poses of § 113(f)(2) of CERCLA.” Id. at 769.  The third factor was that the ASAOC was
titled an Administrative Settlement Agreement. Id.  The final factor was that the ASAOC con-
tained provisions which, taken in concert, intended to resolve the appellants’ liability to the
government. Id.
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tion 113(g)(3),130 which was two years before the complaint was filed.
Thus, the action for contribution under section 113(f) was expired.131
Yet in June 2015, the Western District Court of Kentucky granted
plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of plaintiff’s Third Amended Com-
plaint.132  Upon further review of that plaintiff’s motion, the court deter-
mined that the holding of the Sixth Circuit applied narrowly—to recovery
under the Administrative Settlement Agreement Order and Consent Re-
moval Action (“ASAOCRA”) only—and not to recovery sought as to EPA
Past Costs AOCs, or money owed to the Kentucky Department of Environ-
mental Protection.133  The court reached this determination because the de-
fendants failed to “offer any explanation as to why the costs separate from
those associated with the ASAOCRA are similarly situated despite the fact
that they arose three years or more after the signing of the ASAOCRA and
are expenses incurred for activities separate from those covered by the
ASAOCRA.”134  The defendants were not able to rebut the presumption
that recovery sought under EPA Past Costs AOCs, or money owed to the
Kentucky Department of Environmental Protection, were not part of
ASAOCRA and therefore not time barred.135  Thus, the court granted the
plaintiffs leave to file their Fourth Amended Complaint.136
In addition to allowing the plaintiffs the opportunity to specify the
amount of voluntarily incurred remediation costs, the court also did not
overturn an aspect of its previous 2014 ruling, which held in the plaintiff’s
favor regarding the use of the word “requiring” in their complaint.137  While
the defendants argued that the costs incurred by the plaintiffs were related
to “activities that KDEP [was] requiring to be conducted” and were there-
fore compelled and not voluntary for purposes of Section 107 cost recovery,
the court held otherwise.138  Citing both Atlantic Research and ITT Indus-
130. LWD PRP Grp., 2015 WL 1143019, at *8.
131. Id. at *14.
132. See LWD PRP Grp. v. ACF Indus. LLC, No. 5:12-CV-00127-GNS-HBB, 2015
WL 3539357, at *9, *13 (W.D. Ky. June 3, 2015).  Plaintiffs again sought recovery for: (1)
costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4), (Section 107(a)(4) of CERCLA), (2) contribution
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(f)(1) and (f)(3)(B), (Section 113(f)(1) and (f)(3)(B) of CER-
CLA), and; (3) declaratory relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2), (Section 113(g)(2) of
CERCLA). See Third Amended Complaint at 671–701, LWD PRP Grp. v. ACF Indus.
LLC (2015) (No. 5:12-CV-00127-JHM-HBB), 2014 WL 1757382.
133. See LWD PRP Grp., 2015 WL 3539357, at *12.
134. Id.  Defendants wanted the court to hold that the statute of limitations expired on
all past cost recovery, without demonstrating that those costs were part of ASAOCRA. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at *13.
137. LWD PRP Grp. v. ACF Indus., LLC, No. 5:12-CV-00127-JHM, 2014 WL 901648,
at *6 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 7, 2014).
138. Id.
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tries, Inc. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 506 F.3d. 452, the court declared that the use
of the word “ ‘requiring’ does not indicate that the costs were compelled.”139
Finally, in November 2015, defendant’s last motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
Fourth Amended Complaint seeking past and future voluntary response
costs under section 107 was denied.140  This case has continued this thread
and is still vital as to plaintiff’s Section 107 cost recovery claim.  It also
illustrates how years of amended complaints and procedural motions
avoided addressing Section 107 claims, so as to eliminate longer statutes of
limitation.  This would have avoided cost recovery on procedural bases.
The Northern District of New York ruled similarly on the availability
of a PRP’s contribution claim under Section 113(f) in MPM Silicones, LLC
v. Union Carbide.141  MPM Silicones acquired a contaminated site from
Union Carbide, which had previously used the location as a dump for haz-
ardous waste but did not report this to regulators.142  After having acquired
the site, MPM incurred costs as they cleaned up the waste that was solely
attributable to Union Carbide.143  MPM Silicones then sued Union Car-
bide, simultaneously seeking both Section 107 cost recovery and Section 113
contribution claims for the costs it had incurred and expected to incur in
cleaning the site.144
Pursuant to Cooper, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s Section 113 con-
tribution claim since MPM Silicones had not been sued by the EPA under
Sections 106 or 107 and not yet determined its liability under CERCLA.145
Although the court maintained the more common determination that only
139. Id. at *7 (“When the facts are construed in the light most favorable to the LWD
PRP Group, the use of the word ‘requiring’ could simply indicate that the LWD PRP
Group was voluntarily incurring costs due to fears of potential liability.”) (citing Solutia, Inc.
v. McWane, Inc., 726 F.Supp.2d 1316, 1340–41 (N.D. Ala. 2010) (“the distinction between
compelled and voluntary cleanups is in some measure artificial; virtually all cleanups are
performed by a party who is at least facing the specter of potential liability under
CERLCA.”) (quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551
U.S. 128, 136–37 (2007))).
140. See LWD PRP Grp. v. ACF Indus. LLC, No. 5:12-CV-00127-GNS-HBB, 2015
WL 6755314 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 4, 2015).
141. MPM Silicones, LLC v. Union Carbide, 931 F. Supp. 2d 387, 390 (N.D.N.Y.
2013).
142. Id. at 391.
143. Id.
144. Id.  Apart from CERCLA claims, the plaintiff filed a number of state law claims,
among which were claims for contribution and cost recovery.  The court ruled that CER-
CLA did not preempt the state law claim for cost recovery as it did not disrupt CERCLA’s
settlement scheme. Id.
145. Id. at 395–96 (citing United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 138
(2007)).  The court explained the availability of cost recovery and contribution remedies,
stating that they are not both simultaneously available and do not represent options but
rather remedies for specific instances. Id. at 395–96.  Even though the plaintiff failed to
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one of the two CERCLA sections is available to a PRP under a given set of
facts, rather than both Sections 107 and 113 simultaneously, it did not, how-
ever, dismiss the plaintiff’s Section 107(a) claim for cost recovery.146  It al-
lowed the cost recovery claim to stand because the plaintiffs had voluntarily
incurred costs in cleaning up the site and had not been forced to pay any-
thing as a result of a settlement agreement with either the state environ-
mental agency or the EPA.147
A similar scenario arose in the District of New Jersey, in Queens West
Development Corp. v. Honeywell Intern, Inc.148  This plaintiff also asserted
both Section 107 cost recovery and Section 113 contribution claims for vol-
untarily incurred cleanup costs caused by the defendant’s legal predecessors,
although it had not yet been sued or entered into a settlement agreement
with the state or federal regulator.149  As a result, the court determined that
the proper remedy for the plaintiffs was a cost recovery action under Sec-
tion 107, since the plaintiff had voluntarily incurred their costs rather than
having been compelled to pay for the cleanup under a consent decree or
administrative settlement.150
The Central District of California further explained the importance of
the procedural triggers to a contribution claim under Section 113 in the case
of Whittaker Corp. v. United States.151  There, the plaintiff site owner, Whit-
taker Corp., attempted to recover a portion of the costs it had incurred
under Section 107 as voluntary costs not related to the settlement agree-
ment it reached years after these particular costs were incurred.152  Al-
though Whittaker argued that it is the nature of the costs that should
determine which of the two sections of CERCLA should apply, the court
relied on language from the Atlantic Research decision that specifically stated
that “PRPs that have been subject to §§ 106 or 107 enforcement actions are
properly allege their claims as alternatives, the court allowed their Section 107 claim to stand
and dismissed the Section 113 contribution claim. Id.
146. Id. at 404.
147. Id. at 401–04.
148. Queens W. Dev. Corp. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 10-4876, 2011 WL 3625137
(D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2011).
149. Id. at *1–2 (plaintiffs argued that they had already or would soon in the future,
resolve their liability for any of the cleanup with the government).
150. Id. at *11 (also noting that the plaintiffs do not contend that they are a PRP since
they deny any responsibility for the release of the hazardous material, and as a result are
closed off from a Section 113 contribution claim which is open only to PRP’s).
151. Whittaker Corp. v. United States, No. CV 13-1741, 2014 WL 631113 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 10, 2014).
152. Id. at *17.
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still required to use § 113, thereby ensuring its continued vitality.”153  The
court summarized the issue stating, “[a] party’s procedural circumstances,
not the nature of its alleged costs, will determine whether a party may pur-
sue a contribution action under section 113(f)(1).”154
In Consolidated Edison Co., Inc. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., decided before At-
lantic Research, the Second Circuit addressed whether a PRP could recover
voluntary response costs under Section 107.155  Predicting the holdings in
Atlantic Research, the court held that Section 107(a) allows PRPs to recover
from other PRPs and CERCLA did not “require that the party seeking
necessary costs of response be innocent of wrongdoing.”156  While Consoli-
dated Edison did not expressly resolve the issue of voluntary versus involun-
tary cost incursion by a private party, it did state: “It may be that when a
party expends funds for cleanup solely due to the imposition of liability
through a final administrative order, it has not, in fact, incurred ‘necessary
costs of response’ within the meaning of section 107(a).”157
These courts each have expressly reaffirmed that Sections 107 and 113
are two distinctive remedies, available in two different situations, on differ-
ent facts.  After Cooper, Section 113 contribution can only be used by a
private party after it has been sued by EPA.  Conversely, Section 107 is
used whenever there has not been prior EPA litigation.  The two Supreme
Court decisions state that whether there has been a prior EPA suit, against
the private party now seeking a remedy, decides whether Sections 107 or
113 is used.  The Second Circuit opened up equitable considerations in Sec-
tion 107 as suggested by the Supreme Court in Cooper, by reiterating that a
PRP who gets sued as a defendant under Section 107 can bring a counter-
claim under Section 113 for contribution if it can prove its proportion of the
liability.  Private plaintiffs have not been prevented from recovering in an
153. Id. at *19–20 (citing Appleton Papers, Inc. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 572 F.
Supp. 2d 1034, 1042 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (quoting United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551
U.S. 128, 134 (2007))).  The Whittaker court explained that such language “suggests that
courts need not engage in an analysis of the particular costs sought but should instead focus
on a PRP’s specific procedural status, i.e., whether or not it has been subject to an enforce-
ment action.” Id.
154. Id. at *21–22; see also Sandvik, Inc. v. Hampshire Partners Fund VI, L.P., No. 13-
4667 (SDW) (MCA), 2014 WL 1343081, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2014) (where the Federal
District Court for New Jersey also highlighted the procedural distinctions between Section
107 and Section 113 in denying the plaintiffs’ contribution claim, citing the Supreme Court’s
unambiguous holding in Atlantic Research providing that a party may not bring a Section
113(f)(1) contribution claim in cases where the plaintiff has not been sued under Sections 106
or 107).
155. Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 2005).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
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adequately pled claim for cost recovery.158  It follows that when Congress
added the Section 113(f) contribution claim in the 1986 SARA amendments
to what already existed in the original 1980 Section 107 cost recovery claim,
it logically was Congress’ intent to have at least one of these two cost-
shifting options, or perhaps both, always potentially available to private
parties.
IV. COSTS INCURRED AFTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AS
A NEW DISQUALIFICATION FACTOR
A. In the Federal Appellate Courts
Costs incurred by parties who have entered into a consent decree or
administrative consent order with the government have often been deemed
by lower courts, post-Atlantic Research, as “compelled” costs rather than
voluntary.
This reasoning can create a double-bind, depending on the circuit.  If
costs are deemed “compelled” rather than voluntary, entering into such a
settlement agreement, the legally logical first step, can shut off a cost recov-
ery claim under Section 107, leaving only contribution claims under Section
113.159  This is often not a viable avenue: Section 113 is not available if there
has not been prior government suit against the party.160  And even where
there is a claim from the government short of traditional litigation, when a
party enters into an administrative settlement or consent decree to resolve
the claim, the question courts often face is whether this counts as prior
litigation.161  A footnote in Atlantic Research admitted that there is the possi-
bility of potential “overlap” between remedies of Sections 107 and 113.162
Specifically, the Supreme Court left open the status where a party entered
into a settlement order and incurred response costs:
158. See New York v. Solvent Chem. Co., 453 Fed. Appx. 42, 46 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing
Consol. Edison Co., Inc. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 104 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that
the party would not be prevented from recovery when it adequately pled a claim for cost
recovery under Section 107(a) but had erroneously cited Section 113(f)(1) in its complaint)).
159. See discussion infra Section IV.A.2 and accompanying notes.
160. Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Servs., 543 U.S. 157, 165–66 (2004).
161. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Bankert, 702 F.3d 964, 981–84 (7th Cir. 2012), amended on
reh’g, 733 F.3d 190 (7th Cir. 2013); Centerior Serv. Co. v. ACME Scrap Iron & Metal
Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 351–52 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that potentially responsible parties
could not bring joint and several cost recovery action, but were restricted to action for contri-
bution); LWD PRP Grp. v. ACF Indus., LLC, No. 5:12-CV-00127-JHM, 2014 WL 901648,
at *6 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 7, 2014); Carrier Corp. v. Piper, 460 F. Supp. 2d 827, 840–41 (W.D.
Tenn. 2006) (holding that unilateral administrative orders can qualify as civil actions).
162. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 139 n.6 (2007).
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[T]he PRP does not incur costs voluntarily but does not reimburse
the costs of another party. We do not decide whether these com-
pelled costs of response are recoverable under § 113(f), § 107(a), or
both. For our purposes, it suffices to demonstrate that costs in-
curred voluntarily are recoverable only by way of § 107(a)(4)(B),
and costs of reimbursement to another person pursuant to a legal
judgment or settlement are recoverable only under § 113(f).  Thus,
at a minimum, neither remedy swallows the other, contrary to the
Government’s argument.163
In resolving this open issue, it is important to note two things:
• The decision to settle with the government is voluntary,
never compelled.  Parties have a choice.  If voluntarily en-
tered, costs incurred from that settlement are the result of a
voluntary agreement, even if the agreement has enforceable
binding effect.  In the author’s experience over decades with
CERCLA matters, every CERCLA attorney typically
would advise its client to settle with the government before
initiating any Section 107 or 113 private party litigation, in
order to:
° Remove the government as a party in interest in such
subsequent legal actions, and/or to
° Take advantage of the Section 113(f)(2) contribution
protection “shield” which automatically benefits any
party settling with the government under an administra-
tively- or judicially-approved settlement.164
• If not careful, courts could create a gap in their restrictions
around Sections 107 and 113 applicability that cuts off both
legal options for a private party to allocate liability fairly,
under either Sections 107 or 113, to other responsible par-
ties, undermining Congressional intent discussed above to
provide at least one, and perhaps both, avenues to private
parties.
1. No Automatic Disqualification of Section 107
The Bernstein decision offers some guidance in how to close this poten-
tial gap, where a private party has no recourse to any cost-recovery provi-
sion.165  In Bernstein, the court explained that the mere participation of a
163. Id.
164. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2014).
165. Bernstein, 702 F.3d 964.
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PRP in an AOC does not necessarily require the use of Section 113 as
opposed to Section 107, as the statutory triggers required before a party
avails itself of contribution under Section 113 are twofold: The PRP must
either be subject to suit under CERCLA, or the PRP must have resolved its
liability with the EPA or state agency through a settlement.166  In the Bern-
stein case, the trust had only resolved its liability regarding its first AOC
from 1999, but had not yet completed its duties under the second AOC
from 2002, leaving its liability unresolved with respect to this later 2002
AOC.167  As such, the trustee could still maintain a cost recovery action
under Section 107 against other private parties, since the costs it incurred
were necessary.168  Furthermore, a Section 113 contribution claim was not
available, as neither of the required triggers had been met.169
The Second Circuit addressed the issue of whether involuntary costs
could be recovered under Section 107 in W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Zotos
International, Inc.170  In this case, a PRP looked to recover incurred costs
pursuant to a consent order it had entered with New York’s state environ-
mental regulator.171  Defendant argued that the plaintiffs’ incurred costs
were compelled because of the consent order, and therefore, not an allowed
cost recovery under Section 107.172  Rejecting the defendant’s argument, the
Second Circuit relied on the plain language of the statute; whether a party
enters into a consent agreement before commencing remediation does not
impact whether the party has incurred the response costs required under
Section 107(a): “In the same manner that section 107(a) is not limited solely
to ‘innocent’ parties . . . section 107(a) does not specify that only parties
who ‘voluntarily’ remediate a site have a cause of action.”173  The plaintiff
incurred the costs of remediation versus simply paying another PRP or
agency a reimbursement for cleanup costs that another party incurred.  The
Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs did have a cost-recovery claim under
Section 107(a), despite having a consent decree compelling performance.174
166. See id. at 976.
167. See id. at 977–84.
168. See id. at 981.
169. See id.
170. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos Int’l, Inc., 559 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2009).
171. Id. at 87–88.
172. Id. at 91.
173. Id. at 92.
174. Id. at 96. But see Morrison Enters., LLC v. Dravo Corp., 638 F.3d 594, 604 (8th
Cir. 2011) (relying on Atlantic Research to conclude that response costs incurred pursuant to
an administrative order containing penalties for failure to comply were not incurred volunta-
rily and, therefore, could not form the basis of a Section 107(a) claim).
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2. Disqualification of Section 107
Before the Bernstein circuit court decision, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in BFI Waste Systems of North
America, L.L.C. v. City of Belvidere, considered for the first time whether or
not “compelled costs incurred as a result of a consent decree are ‘incurred’
within the meaning of Section 107(a)(4)(B).”175  Persuaded by the Third
Circuit Court’s reasoning in Agere Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Environmental
Technology Corp.,176 the court held that PRPs who incurred costs as a result
of a consent decree were limited only to a contribution claim under Section
113(f).177
Both the district court in the initial decision, and the Seventh Circuit,
subsequently in Bernstein, agreed that allowing settling PRPs to recover
under Section 107 would help them avoid CERCLA liability by shifting the
whole cost to other PRPs, while protecting them as plaintiffs from contribu-
tion claims and counter-claims brought by other PRPs under Section 113.178
This illustrates the advantage of settling first with the government: One
enjoys automatic statutory contribution protection,179 which also can be
drafted as a provision into the AOC or consent decree that is entered.
Of the decisions since Atlantic Research, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision
in Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc. rendered a particularly non-inclusive reading
of distinctions negotiated in the settlement agreement between the PRP
and the government.  It determined that only a Section 113 contribution
action is available to PRPs once a settlement order had been entered into by
the parties seeking later cost recovery.180  In Solutia, plaintiff PRPs sought
Section 107 cost recovery and Section 113 contribution for response costs it
incurred, after and contemplated by a CERCLA “Partial Consent Decree,”
from other PRPs who had entered into a separate consent decree with the
EPA in order to reimburse the agency for costs it incurred in cleaning up
the contaminated site.181  Solutia argued that although it agreed to clean
certain areas of the contaminated site, their original consent decree with the
175. BFI Waste Sys. of N. Am. v. City of Belvidere, No. 09 C 50061, 2011 WL
9105930, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2011).
176. Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 227–29 (3d Cir.
2010) (holding Sections 107 and 113 did not overlap in the instant case).
177. BFI Waste Sys., 2011 WL 9105930, at *3.
178. Id.
179. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2014).
180. Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1235–37 (11th Cir. 2012).
181. Id. at 1234.  Plaintiffs contended that the EPA’s later settlement with the other
PRP’s “undermined” their right to seek contribution claims from other PRP’s that was pre-
served in the original consent decree, but later agreed to cleanup specific areas of the con-
tamination site. Id.
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EPA only obligated it to clean up waste attributable to them, thereby mak-
ing its cleanup of all other waste attributable to other PRPs “voluntary.”182
The court rejected this argument and maintained that its agreement to clean
up only specific areas constituted an obligation, compelling it to incur the
costs and thus leaving Section 113 contribution as its exclusive remedy.183
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled similarly in Morrison Enter-
prises, LLC v. Dravo Corp.  In Morrison, a city and the successor owner of a
contaminated site, Morrison Enterprises, were sued under CERCLA and
subsequently entered into an AOC to clean up the site.184  Both the city and
Morrison stressed that Morrison undertook the cleaning of the contami-
nated site voluntarily, while the defendant, Dravo Corp., was the party le-
gally liable for the contamination.185  The court found that this
interpretation ignored the fact that both plaintiffs had entered into agree-
ments attempting to settle their liabilities for the site.186  As a result of
Morrison having been sued under Section 107(a) and both plaintiffs having
settled their liabilities for the site with government agencies under various
AOCs, the court refused to characterize any of their subsequent efforts as
voluntary, and as a result denied the cost recovery claim under Section
107(a).187
There remains an open question regarding how settlement with a state
authority under state law, not invoking CERCLA, affects future private
party CERCLA claims.  In Trinity Industries v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.,
the Third Circuit considered whether or not a consent order pursuant to
two Pennsylvania statutes constitutes a resolution of liability as required in
Section 113 after Cooper.188  The court consulted the Second Circuit’s hold-
ing in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos International, Inc., where the court held that
“agreement to a consent order that resolved a plaintiff’s New York state-law
claims did not authorize the plaintiff’s suit under § 113(f)(B)(3) because the
182. Id. at 1238 n.10.
183. Id. at 1238–39.
184. Morrison Enters., LLC v. Dravo Corp., 638 F.3d 594, 599 (8th Cir. 2011).  Morri-
son entered into two AOCs in 1996 to clean up the site in question while the city entered
into multiple other agreements to clean up the site in 1992, 1998, 2004, and 2007. Id.
185. Id. at 604.
186. See id. at 604–05.
187. Id.  The court distinguished the city’s argument from the three cases it cited, W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Zotos International, Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 91–93 (2d Cir. 2009), Kotrous v. Goss-
Jewett Co., Inc., 523 F.3d 924, 934 (9th Cir. 2008), and Schaefer v. Town of Victor, 457 F.3d
188, 191–92, 201–02 (2d Cir. 2006). Id.  Each case permitted a Section 107 action since the
plaintiffs in those cases had not settled their Section 107 liability nor had they entered into a
settlement as defined by CERCLA Section 113.
188. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 133 (3d Cir.
2013).
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consent order ‘did not resolve CERCLA claims that could be brought by
the federal government.’ ”189  Nevertheless, the Third Circuit held that Sec-
tion 113(f)(3)(B) “does not require resolution of CERCLA liability in par-
ticular.”190  Therefore, allowing a settling PRP under such state statute
subsequently to seek contribution under Section 113 will not enable it to
impermissibly double-collect under CERCLA.191
B. In the Federal District Courts
1. No Automatic Disqualification of Section 107
In the Eastern District of Michigan in Ford Motor Co. v. Michigan Con-
solidated Gas Co., MichCon, a non-settling PRP, asserted a claim for Section
107 cost recovery for cleanup expenses it had incurred and would incur in
the future.192  The United States claimed that its consent decree with Ford
prevented MichCon from asserting its Section 107 cost recovery claim since
it considered “common law contribution claims to fall within the scope of
the . . . [consent decree].”193  The court noted that the real issues were:
whether the earlier consent decree between Ford and the United States
barred the non-settlor, MichCon, from asserting its own cost recovery
claim; and whether MichCon’s status as a PRP required it to bring only a
Section 113 contribution claim (which at that time of suit would have been
time-barred by the much shorter Section 113 statute of limitation).194  Find-
ing the government’s argument that MichCon’s cost recovery claim was re-
ally a contribution claim unpersuasive, the court refrained from dismissing
MichCon’s Section 107 claim because it was not a party to the consent de-
189. Id. at 136 (citing W.R. Grace, 559 F.3d at 91).
190. Trinity, 735 F.3d at 137.  The court reasoned that the two concerned Pennsylvania
state statutes resembled CERCLA and referred to CERCLA provisions. Id.  The remedies
provided under the state statutes were either virtually identical or were the remediation of
CERCLA. Id. at 136–37.  It concluded:
We therefore agree with Trinity and the United States that § 113(f)(3)(B) does
not require that a party have settled its liability under CERCLA in particular to
be eligible for contribution. To begin with, we are persuaded by the lack of any
indication to the contrary in the plain language of the statute itself. In addition,
our case law in a related context compels this result.
Id.
191. See id. at 137.
192. Ford Motor Co. v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co., 993 F. Supp. 2d 693, 697 (E.D. Mich.
2014).
193. Id. at 701.
194. Id. at 701–02 (summarizing the government’s argument as “(1) MichCon’s § 107(a)
claim must be construed as a contribution claim because its status as PRP mandates that it
cannot invoke joint and several liability and (2) therefore MichCon’s claim is barred by the
SRA CD which prohibits a contribution claim ‘as may otherwise provided by law’”).
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cree (which compelled action from the plaintiffs and not the defendants).195
The court, in a subsequent opinion, found no authority for the proposition
that “a party who has incurred voluntary costs and faces future potential
liability for further costs in relation to a single hazardous site can ‘slice and
dice’ the costs into separate claims.”196
When recently faced with a somewhat similar situation, the Eastern
District of North Carolina also found that non-settling parties could main-
tain a cost recovery action under Section 107.  In Carolina Power & Lighting
Co. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., one of the defendants, PCS Phosphate (PCS),
was not a party to the administrative settlement between the EPA and the
plaintiff, Carolina Power and Light Company (CP&L).197  However, PCS
did enter a trust agreement with CP&L, and through that trust contributed
to the cost of cleaning the contaminated site.198  Defendant PCS claimed a
right to cost recovery under Section 107(a) as its only available remedy,
contending that it had not settled its liability with the EPA and so could not
utilize Section 113(f)’s contribution remedy under the Supreme Court’s lim-
itation on Section 113 in Aviall v. Cooper.199
The court explained that to determine whether Section 107 cost recov-
ery or Section 113 contribution is available to the PRP, the two most impor-
tant questions to ask are: “whether claimant has settled its liability through
administrative or judicial action and whether claimant is seeking ‘contribu-
tion’ from defendants.”200  In this case, the answer to both questions was no.
The trust agreement between PCS and the other plaintiffs, as well as the
remedy PCS sought, could not truly be considered a contribution claim,
since PCS’s liability had not yet been determined.201  Because PCS had not
been sued by the government and did not settle with any government
195. Id. at 704 n.9.
196. Ford Motor Co. v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., No. 08-13503, 2015 WL 540253, at
*12 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 10, 2015).  This decision relied heavily on Hobart Corp. v. Waste Man-
agement of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2014), in which the Sixth Circuit held that a
party which resolves its Superfund liability to the government under the EPA’s new model
administrative consent order is limited to a contribution action against third parties. Id. at
757.
197. Carolina Power & Lighting Co. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., No. 5:08-CV-460, 2013
WL 1246833, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 27, 2013).
198. Id. at *3 (after settling with the EPA, CP&L sought contribution from the defend-
ants, pursuant to Sections 107(a) and 113(f), and in response PCS counterclaimed against
plaintiffs and cross-claimed against other defendants seeking cost recovery based on their
contribution to the removal action, pursuant to Section 107(a)).
199. Id. at *5.
200. Id. at *6 (citing United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 138 (2007)).
201. Id. (citing Bernstein v. Bankert, 702 F.3d 964, 981–83 (7th Cir. 2012) (“recogniz-
ing that ‘the statutory trigger for a § [113(f)] contribution claim is . . . the resolution of
liability through settlement,’ and holding, in part, that ‘[t]rustees [that] have been subjected
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agency, PCS received no contribution protections under Section 113(f)(2),
and could still be sued by EPA or other PRPs.202  Without settling its liabil-
ity, PCS could not seek contribution pursuant to the Court’s distinction in
Cooper, but was left with and rather could only seek cost recovery under
Section 107(a) for voluntary expenses paid into the group trust to remediate
the site.203
The reasoning appears correct, and necessary; namely, that Section 107
cost recovery should be the default always-available cost allocation alterna-
tive of the two CERCLA remedies.  This follows from a key fact estab-
lished in each of the Supreme Court opinions:
• Post-Cooper, in a significant number of factual situations, because
there is no prior suit from the government, Section 113 contribution
is not an available option for a private party.204
• In Atlantic Research, the Court did not state or suggest that the posi-
tion taken subsequently by several lower federal courts was opera-
tive, e.g., that a settlement with the government prior to attempting
to allocate cleanup costs de facto, renders future expenditures by the
settling PRP not voluntarily incurred or ineligible for Section 107
cost recovery claims against other non-settling PRPs.205
The CP&L decision demonstrates that an agreement that does not set-
tle a party’s liability will not trigger the Section 113 contribution remedy
prerequisite.206  Additionally, the case also spoke to the effect of Atlantic
Research regarding voluntary cleanup efforts by PRPs, when the court ex-
plained: “The purpose of the Supreme Court’s holding in Atlantic Research
was to alleviate concerns that responsible parties performing voluntary
cleanups, without first being sued by the government under § 106 or
§ 107(a), would be penalized.”207  This interprets the Supreme Court deci-
sions as opening Section 107(a) as the always-available fail-safe avenue for
remediation cost reallocation.
In 2015, an appeal came before the Seventh Circuit, which determined
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 was appropriate as a sanction for
filing a complaint precluded by an unambiguous prior settlement agree-
to no civil action [from the United States] under [§ 106 or § 107(a) ]’ could not seek contri-
bution under § 113(f).”)).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See Cooper v. Aviall, 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
205. See United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007).
206. See Carolina Power & Lighting, 2013 WL 1246833, at *3.
207. Id. at *6 (citing Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 136–39).
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ment.208  This, for the first time, imposes judicial sanction for choosing
either a Section 107 or 113 CERCLA cost-shifting remedy, which is later
found to not comport with the current holdings or preferences of the partic-
ular Circuit.  Since these preferences to disallow use of Section 107 cost
recovery by private parties was an evolutionary journey of the various cir-
cuits between 1994 and 2004, which thereafter were overturned by the Su-
preme Court in its 2007 Atlantic Research decision, this holding increases the
stakes without clarifying the standards.  Strong sanctions for employing
Section 107 CERCLA claims allowed by the Supreme Court but disfavored
by a particular circuit, when other circuits have a contrary permissive
stance, encourages forum shopping by claimants and higher stakes.
Some courts construe all costs incurred by a party that has entered a
settlement or consent decree with the government as compelled expendi-
tures not voluntarily undertaken, and thus precluding Section 107 cost re-
covery claims.209  Yet the reimbursement payments for costs already paid or
direct payments for costs incurred may allow for Section 107 cost recovery.
In 2012, the Delaware federal bankruptcy court addressed this issue in In re
Crucible Materials Corp.210  In that case, the debtor PRP, Crucible Materials
(Crucible), had entered into a settlement agreement with a second PRP,
EPA, and the state environmental department for the cleanup of a contami-
nated site.211  The debtor filed a claim for cost recovery under Section 107
against a second non-settling PRP.212
In siding with the trustee’s claim for cost recovery, the court noted two
important factors that weighed in favor of allowing Section 107 cost recov-
ery.  First, the court noted that Crucible’s payments into a trust that funded
both past and future cleanup costs for the site (while cleanup efforts were
on-going), were not mere reimbursement to other parties, but rather pay-
ments made by Crucible that directly paid for the cleanup.213  The second
factor in favor of allowing Section 107 cost recovery was that Crucible had
not been sued by any of the PRPs, the EPA, or the state environmental
department, thereby cutting off its ability to seek contribution under Sec-
208. United States v. Rogers Cartage Co., 794 F.3d 854, 863 (7th Cir. 2015).  In other
words, because the settlement agreement was clear and unambiguous—the preclusion of fil-
ing a complaint is conduct that fits “squarely within the ambit of Rule 11.” Id.
209. See discussion infra Section IV.C.2.
210. In re Crucible Materials Corp., No. 09-11582 (MFW), 2012 WL 5360945 (Bankr.
D. Del. Oct. 31, 2012).
211. Id. at *1–2.
212. Id. at *2.
213. Id. at *10.
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tion 113.214  The on-going nature of the cleanup, and the fact that Crucible
had not been sued under CERCLA, meant that the trustee could still pur-
sue a Section 107 cost recovery claim against other private parties.215  This
reinforces the holding of other courts, such as CP&L discussed above, which
construe private party Section 107 cost recovery claims as the always open
avenue to reallocate costs of remediation which are disproportionately ab-
sorbed by a subset of PRPs.
A court also can take the position that a settlement, alone, doesn’t en-
tirely resolve liability of the settling party.  In Allied Waste Transportation,
Inc. v. John Sexton Sand & Gravel Corp., the owner of a landfill’s entry into a
state consent order was not found to restrict its Section 107 cost recovery
action against a co-owner of the site.216  Citing Bernstein, the court held that
the entry of the consent order, alone, did not resolve Allied’s liability:
“[T]he resolution of Allied’s liability is contingent on the completion of the
work required by the Order.”217  Although not contradicting that a party’s
access to Section 107 cost recovery could have a finite life, this logic shifts
the critical point of time from the beginning of settlement to the comple-
tion of the remediation work required by the settlement.
In Chevron Environmental Management Co. v. BKK Corp., the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of California reaffirmed and
emphasized that a private party may seek cost recovery under Section 107
only when it “itself incurred cleanup costs,” and people who reimbursed
response costs by other parties could only seek a Section 113 contribution
remedy.218  This distinction seems appropriate.  The court briefly addressed
both the common law meaning of “voluntary” and the plain statutory lan-
guage interpretation of what it means to resolve one’s CERCLA liability.219
The court found in favor of plaintiff and held that a consent decree is not “a
214. Id. at *9–10 (citing Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204,
225–27 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that in a strikingly similar fact pattern, a PRP was allowed
to seek cost recovery under Section 107 as they had also funded a trust that paid for on-going
cleanup efforts and had not been sued under Sections 106 or 107); see also Ferrey, Toxic “Plain
Meaning” and “Moon-shadow,” supra note 22 (discussing Agere Sys. and the interpretation of R
voluntarily incurred costs). But see In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 442 B.R. 236 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011) (where the court found a Section 107(a) claim for cost recovery was appro-
priately categorized as “reimbursement”).
215. In re Crucible Materials Corp., 2012 WL 5360945, at *9 (“[T]he general rule that
payments satisfying a settlement agreement are not deemed ‘costs incurred’ does not apply
here.”).
216. Allied Waste Transp., Inc. v. John Sexton Sand & Gravel Corp., No. 13 C 1029,
2016 WL 3443897 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2016).
217. Id. at *12 (citing Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190 (7th Cir. 2013)).
218. Chevron Envtl. Mgmt. Co. v. BKK Corp., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1089 (E.D. Cal.
2012).
219. Id. at 1090.
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satisfaction or release from liability for any conditions or claims arising as a
result of past, current or future operations.”220  The court interpreted nar-
rowly whether or not a cleanup pursuant to a consent decree is “voluntary”
and held that the “consent decree’s potential penalties do not equate to
Chevron’s involuntary actions in that the penalties are discretionary.”221
2. Disqualification of Section 107
The far more common context in which courts have had to determine
the availability of a Section 107 cost recovery claim arose in the Northern
District of Oklahoma in Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., v. TCI Pacific Communi-
cations, Inc.222  There the court dealt with the cleanup of contaminated
grounds around the site of a smelting facility in Collinsville, Oklahoma.223
After having been sued by the Oklahoma environmental agency, Cyprus
and the state agency reached a settlement agreement in 2009 that required
Cyprus to undertake cleanup activity at the site.224  In 2011, Cyprus sued
the defendants, TCI Pacific and CBS Operations, as PRPs under Section
107.225  TCI moved to dismiss the action, alleging that Cyprus’s proper
remedy was limited to a contribution claim under Section 113, because Cy-
prus incurred its cleanup costs while fulfilling the provisions of the consent
decree, and argued that every court that had considered this issue since
Atlantic Research has ruled similarly.226
Cyprus argued in rebuttal that its cost recovery claim should not be
dismissed since the Tenth Circuit had not yet ruled on the availability of
Section 107 relief when a party incurred costs pursuant to a consent decree
or settlement agreement after the Atlantic Research decision.227  The trial
court disagreed.228  Citing both post-Atlantic Research decisions from other
circuits and the Tenth Circuit’s pre-Atlantic Research decision on the issue,
the court found that to allow Section 107 cost recovery for a PRP which had
not voluntarily incurred response costs, would: allow for an unfair windfall
for the settling party, as it could assert joint and several liability against
other non-settling PRPs; and negate the purpose of the subsequent 1986
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. v. TCI Pac. Commc’ns, Inc., No. 11-CV-0252-JED-
PJC, 2013 WL 6238485 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 3, 2013).
223. Id. at *1.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at *4.
227. Id.
228. Id. at *4–5.
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SARA Superfund amendment codifying Section 113 contribution claims,
which does not so favor private plaintiffs.229
Although a number of more recent cases have held open Section 107
cost recovery claims when a PRP entered into a settlement agreement with
the government prior to beginning a cleanup, other courts still believe that
any settlement makes all future expenditures “compelled,” and “compelled”
costs cannot be recovered under Section 107 and can be sought only by
contribution claims under Section 113.  However, Section 113 after Cooper is
now not available where the EPA has not sued the PRP initially.
In Trinity Industries, Inc. v. Chicago Bridge and Iron Co., the Western
District of Pennsylvania maintained a hard-line distinction between volun-
tary and compulsory costs once a consent agreement exists.230  In this case,
the owner plaintiff incurred cleanup costs pursuant to both a state court
order and an administrative settlement with the state.231  Plaintiff then filed
a claim against the former owner for both Section 113 contribution and
Section 107 cost recovery.232  The court held that Trinity did not “incur” the
costs itself since Trinity paid them after a court approved an administrative
settlement, making them involuntary.233  Here is the catch-22 of the hold-
ing: The district court also dismissed Trinity’s Section 113 contribution
claims, holding that its consent decree with the state agency only settled its
liability under state law rather than its federal liability under CERCLA.234
Therefore, with no prior litigation with EPA, Cooper bars any recourse to
Section 113.  This “shut-out” of any remedy is problematic within a
229. See id. (citing Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 206–07 (7th Cir. 2013); Solutia
Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1236–37 (11th Cir. 2012); Morrison Enters., LLC. v.
Dravo Corp., 638 F.3d 594, 603 (8th Cir. 2011); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 128 (2d Cir. 2010)) (quoting Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl.
Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 228–29 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[Plaintiffs who had entered into consent
decrees with the EPA] would not be subject to equitable allocation.  They would have no
liability because they would be able to assert joint and several liability against the other
parties.  This is a perverse result, since a primary goal of CERCLA is to make polluters
pay.”)).
230. Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 867 F. Supp. 2d 754 (W.D. Pa.
2012).
231. Id. at 757–58.
232. Id. at 759.
233. Id. at 760–61 (quoting United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 139
(2007) (“When a party pays to satisfy . . . a court judgment, it does not incur its own costs of
response.  Rather, it reimburses other parties for costs that those parties incurred.”)) (citing
Agere Sys., 602 F.3d at 225 (explaining the ordinary meaning of “incur[ing]” a cost as “a bill
one obligates oneself to pay”)).
234. Id. at 761–62.
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Superfund scheme which included two avenues to re-allocate financial
liability.235
When Trinity appealed this ruling to the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, however, its position received a somewhat more favorable view by the
court.  The appellate court determined that a PRP could still maintain a
Section 113(f)(3)(B) claim for contribution, even if the settlement agree-
ment did not resolve CERLA liability, as a contribution claim under that
section “requires only the existence of a settlement resolving liability to the
United States or a state ‘for some or all of a response action.’”236  In clari-
fying its position, the court was persuaded by both the plain language of the
statute, which makes no indication that contribution under Section 113
should be allowed only if paid before a paying party’s settlement, and case
law that used the same approach for cost recovery actions under Section
107.237  The court also noted that Pennsylvania law allowed for Common-
wealth consent orders to simultaneously resolve a PRP’s liability under both
Pennsylvania law and CERCLA.238  The court discarded the older interpre-
tation that only consent orders that specifically settled CERCLA claims
could fully resolve a PRP’s CERCLA liability.239
Some circuit courts going forward clung to their reasoning prior to the
Atlantic Research Supreme Court decision which overturned that prior cir-
cuit court reasoning limiting private party cost allocation using CERCLA
Section 107.  The Eleventh Circuit, in Solutia Inc. v. McWane, Inc., is one of
the courts to digress from the holdings of the days-prior Cooper decision.240
In Solutia Inc. v. McWane, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit considered whether or
not CERCLA allows settling parties to recover cleanup costs under Section
107.241  The court first recognized that cleanup costs incurred voluntarily
235. This result, leaving no recourse to any statutory or common law remedies, was
never contemplated in any legislative history or by the Supreme Court when it issued its
historic 2004 and 2007 opinions on CERCLA. See Cooper v. Aviall Serv., 543 U.S. 157
(2004); Atl. Research, 551 U.S. 128.
236. Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 2013)
(quoting Section 113(f)(3)(B)) (explaining that Section 113 “does not state that the ‘response
action’ in question must have been initiated pursuant to CERCLA—a requirement that
might easily have been written into the provision”).
237. Id. at 136–37 (citing United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1275 (3d
Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by United States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.,
432 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2005)).
238. Id. at 137 (“[U]nder Pennsylvania law, remediation pursuant to the LRA is
remediation under CERCLA.  Thus, the resolution of LRA claims necessarily means resolu-
tion of claims under CERCLA . . . .”).
239. Id. at 138 (citing Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d
112, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2010)).
240. See Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2012).
241. Id. at 1235.
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and directly by a PRP should be recoverable only under Section
107(a)(4)(B), which could, under certain conditions, impose joint and sev-
eral liabilities on the defendants.242
The court then declared that persons, who incurred response costs pur-
suant to a judicially approved consent decree, or settlement under CER-
CLA, may only seek contribution for reimbursement costs from other PRPs
under Section 113.243  Ultimately, it held that the settling plaintiff could
only bring Section 113 claims against the defendant because allowing a set-
tling plaintiff to bring Section 107 claims against other PRPs will grant
them a chance with joint and several liability to escape their liability en-
tirely and bar defendants from seeking contribution counterclaims against
the plaintiff.244  This is not what the Supreme Court stated in Atlantic Re-
search.245  Moreover, contribution protection, pursuant to Section 113(f)(2),
can apply to any party who enters a judicially- or administratively-approved
settlement, whether a subsequent action is brought not only pursuant to
Section 107, but also pursuant to Section 113.246  Notwithstanding this, the
court stated that other courts have interpreted Atlantic Research as ruling
that Section 113(f) is the sole remedy for parties compelled to incur cleanup
costs due to a settlement or consent decree.247
V. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: PREFERRING § 113 OVER § 107
A common argument cited by courts, both before and after the Atlantic
Research decision of the Supreme Court, for the use of Section 113 contribu-
tion claims in lieu of Section 107 cost recovery claims, is that Section 107’s
potential application of joint and several liability can create inequitable re-
sults.248  Joint and several liability can be especially potent if the party
claiming cost recovery has already been sued under CERCLA and settled
its liability, because Section 113(f)(2) of CERCLA provides for a contribu-
tion bar for any parties who have resolved their liability with the govern-
ment in an appropriately approved settlement or order.249  The outcome
potentially could be that a party could settle its liability with the govern-
ment and then sue another PRP for 100% of the response costs under Sec-
tion 107.  This allows a party to assert joint and several liability while being
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1236–37.
245. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 139–40 (2007).
246. Id. at 140.
247. Solutia, 672 F.3d at 1236–37.
248. For a discussion of joint and several liability, see United States v. Monsanto Co.,
858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
249. See also supra notes 51, 229 and accompanying text R
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immune to any counterclaims from the newly sued PRPs (which can only
bring a Section 113 contribution claim, which would be barred).
This argument, commonly labeled the “contribution bar” argument, is
based on the implication that Section 107 always imposes joint and several
liability on defendants.250  However, this is not true:
• CERCLA never mentions joint and several liability;251 the final ver-
sion of CERCLA deleted all reference to joint and several
liability.252
• It is a discretionary element of federal common law.253
• It does not apply whenever the injury from contamination is
divisible.254
• The most recent Supreme Court decision on CERCLA cautions
that joint and several liability cannot be applied without first looking
to divide the liability severally.255
• The Supreme Court suggested that the equitable factors employed
in adjudicating Section 113 contribution claims also could be applied
to Section 107 cost recovery claims.256
Courts have held that PRP liability is joint and several if a PRP does
not offer evidence for dividing the harm of the contamination and the re-
sponse costs.257  Nevertheless, the use of Section 107 cost recovery when a
Section 113 contribution claim is available is often discouraged as under-
250. E.g., Bernstein v. Bankert, 702 F.3d 964, 980 (7th Cir. 2012).
251. FERREY, supra note 36, at 444. R
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 445–47.
255. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 614 (2009).
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 673 (5th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 169–70 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that it was sufficient
for plaintiff to show that a waste similar to that sent by the defendants was found at the site),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc. 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1486 (D.
Colo. 1985) (“It is clear, however, that the deletion of all references to joint and several
liability from [CERCLA] did not signify that Congress rejected these standards of liabil-
ity.”). But see New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating
that joint and several liability is not absolute under certain circumstances).  Courts have used
different standards when determining whether or not there exists a basis of divisibility. See,
e.g., In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 903 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that joint and
several liability should be imposed only in “exceptional circumstances” when the “expert
testimony and other evidence establishes a factual basis for making a reasonable estimate that
will fairly apportion liability,” and that the court should not be dissuaded from dividing
liability just because apportionment is difficult to determine with certainty).
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mining the settlement scheme of CERCLA.258  After the most recent 2009
Supreme Court opinion in Burlington Northern, which provided that courts,
as their first inquiry, must divide the liability for individual PRPs if there is
a basis asserted and proven to do so, this is a suspect conclusion.259  And
regardless of whether there was any basis in the statute or not, the Supreme
Court in Atlantic Research inserted equitable factors into future Section 107
decisions of courts, which renders Section 107 as equitably flexible as Sec-
tion 113.260
A. In the Federal Appellate Courts
1. No Automatic Disqualification of Section 107
In shedding more light on these policy arguments, the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s Bernstein decision dismissed this so-called “contribution bar” argument
(under which a judicially- or administratively-approved settlement with the
government of a CERCLA matter bars suit by EPA or private parties) in
favor of an argument of procedural distinctness (that Sections 107 and 113
were designed to address separate and distinct situations, not to be inter-
changeable options).261  The court explained that the “contribution bar” ar-
gument is based on the assumption that when a party sues under Section
107 for cost recovery, joint and several liability may be imposed on the
defendant.262  From there, the argument proceeds based on the explicit con-
tribution bar found in CERCLA Section 113(f)(2), which grants a party
who settles with the federal or state government immunity from further
legal contribution claims.263
The consequence of the contribution bar is that a party who has reached
a settlement with the government could thereafter seek a cost recovery
claim under Section 107, and shift all the liability onto the other, non-set-
tling defendant PRPs.264  The court noted, however, that this argument is
based on the incorrect assumption that cost recovery under Section 107 nec-
essarily imposes joint and several liability.265  As the court explained “ap-
portionment is proper where there is a reasonable basis for determining the
258. See discussion infra Section V.A.2 and accompanying notes.
259. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 614.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 235–239. R
261. Bernstein v. Bankert, 702 F.3d 964, 980 (7th Cir. 2012).
262. Id. at 979.
263. Id.
264. Id. (citing Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2012));
Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 228–29 (3d Cir. 2010).
265. Bernstein, 702 F.3d at 979.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\6-1\MEA104.txt unknown Seq: 42 12-MAY-17 12:52
192 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 6:1
contribution of each cause to a single harm.”266  The Supreme Court later
supported this perspective in Burlington Northern.267
While dismissing the “contribution bar” argument as an automatic dis-
qualification, the court stated that the “procedural distinctness” of the reme-
dies is a more persuasive reason to limit a PRP to one remedy or the
other.268  This line of reasoning was upheld by the Second Circuit in Niag-
ara Mohawk, where the court explained that “to allow [a qualifying contribu-
tion plaintiff] to proceed under [Section 107(a)] would in effect nullify the
SARA amendment.”269  The Bernstein court agreed with this reasoning,
holding that:
If [Section 107] already provided the rights of action contemplated
by the SARA amendments, then the amendments were just so
many superfluous words.  The canons of statutory construction
counsel against any interpretation that leads to that result.270
2. Disqualification of Section 107
The Solutia decision cites arguments regarding potential joint and sev-
eral liability under Section 107 in restricting the plaintiff’s remedy to Sec-
tion 113 contribution.271  Emphasizing the existence of joint and several
liability under certain conditions for Section 107 claims, the Solutia court
explained that to allow settling parties, like the plaintiffs, to assert cost
recovery claims under Section 107 potentially would effectively shift all
their costs on to other PRPs.272  The other PRPs would then be barred, due
to Section 113(f)(2)’s counter-claim bar, from asserting claims for their own
contribution costs against the plaintiffs.273
The plaintiffs argued that they should still have been allowed a Section
107 cost recovery remedy since the court could use prudential discretionary
authority to equitably apportion liability between the parties, thus prevent-
266. Id. at 974.  “As a result, counterclaim or no counterclaim, there is little to no danger
that a defendant could be gamed into shouldering full liability, or more than his fair share
. . . .” Id. (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R. Co., v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 614
(2009)); see also N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FirstEnergy Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 417,
488 (N.D.N.Y 2011) (discussing the possibility of apportionment of costs under Section
107(a)).
267. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 614.
268. Bernstein, 702 F.3d at 979.
269. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., 596 F.3d 112, 128 (2d Cir.
2010).
270. Bernstein, 702 F.3d at 979.
271. Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1235–37 (11th Cir. 2012).
272. Id. at 1236–37.
273. Id. at 1237.
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ing the inequitable outcome of shifting their entire costs to the other
PRPs.274  The Supreme Court decision in Atlantic Research supports a
court’s ability to exercise such equitable authority when applying Section
107, notwithstanding that it is not explicitly found in CERCLA.275  Despite
the Section 113(f)(2) contribution protection statutorily afforded settling
parties against other government or private claims, the Atlantic Research
Court assumed that plaintiffs using Section 107 would not be immune from
litigation counterclaims pursuant to Section 113.276  Such counterclaims
would provide a mechanism for a court to equitably apportion de novo the
total cost burden among co-liable litigants.277  The Supreme Court observed
that an equitable allocation of response costs could be achieved by bringing
“a Section 113(f) counterclaim,”278 and noted that the Section 113(f)(2) “set-
tlement bar does not by its terms protect against cost recovery liability
under Section 107(a).”279  The Supreme Court stated that “a defendant PRP
in such a § 107(a) suit could blunt any inequitable distribution of costs by
filing a § 113(f) counterclaim.”280
The Solutia court, however, found that such a determination “would
require this Court to challenge the Supreme Court’s assumption in Atlantic
Research that Section 107(a) provides for joint and several liability” and “re-
quire substantial reworking of CERCLA’s remedial scheme.”281  However,
CERCLA actually says nothing about joint and several liability.282  This
2012 circuit opinion also seems to ignore the other 2009 Supreme Court
CERCLA opinion, which limits any application of joint and several liabil-
ity,283 as well as the reinsertion of equitable factors in Section 107 cost
recovery determinations in Atlantic Research.284  Joint and several liability is
established by federal court precedent on a case-by-case basis, and limited
only to situations where the harm is determined to be indivisible,285 as fur-
ther clarified by the Supreme Court in 2009 in Burlington Northern.286
274. Id.
275. See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 138–40 (2007).
276. See id. at 140.
277. See id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1237 n.7 (11th Cir. 2012).
282. FERREY, supra note 36, at 444–45. R
283. Compare Burlington N. & Santa Fe. R.R. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 614
(2009), with FERREY, supra note 36, at 444. R
284. See Solutia, 672 F.3d 1230.
285. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 169–70 (4th Cir. 1988); FERREY, supra
note 36, at 444–45. R
286. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 614.
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B. In the Federal District Courts
1. No Automatic Disqualification of Section 107
Although the Circuit Court ruling in Bernstein favors the “procedural
distinctness” approach, federal trial courts still have expressed concern re-
garding the potential skirting of liability by PRPs who may seek recovery
under Section 107’s joint and several liability provision. In Chartis Specialty
Insurance Co. v. United States, the Northern District of California examined
the availability of Section 107 joint and several liability after the Atlantic
Research ruling.287  That court clarified that although a PRP’s use of a Sec-
tion 107 claim against a fellow PRP (holding them jointly and severally
liable) could at first shift all the costs for the cleanup to the other defendant
PRP, such a claim did not entirely avoid the equitable factors considered in
a contribution claim.288  In examining the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of
Atlantic Research, the court determined that PRPs are able to bring Section
107 claims holding other PRPs jointly and severally liable because the sued
PRPs would then be able lodge a counterclaim under Section 113.289  De-
spite the government’s argument that requiring a defendant in their posi-
tion to file a Section 113 counterclaim equates to burden shifting onto the
defendant, the court ruled consistently with Atlantic Research, which specifi-
cally allowed for such a procedure and outcome.290
While the potential for inequitable shifting of recovery costs often
makes a cost recovery action under Section 107 an especially strong remedy,
the Northern District of New York, in New York State Electric & Gas Corp. v.
FirstEnergy Corp., explained that an apportionment of cost may be appropri-
ate in certain circumstances.291  Not making any automatic disqualification
of use of Section 107, the court explained that although joint and several
liability generally applies to cost recovery actions under Section 107(a),
“[t]his does not mean . . . that there is no apportionment to be made be-
tween PRPs under section 107(a).”292  The court did not automatically dis-
qualify Section 107, and cited the subsequent Supreme Court opinion in
287. See Chartis Specialty Ins. Co. v. United States, No. C-13-1527 EMC, 2013 WL
3803334, at *16 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2013).  In Chartis, the plaintiffs, an arms manufacturer
and its insurer, sought recovery from the United States under Section 107 for costs they had
incurred in remediating a polluted site as the U.S. was liable for the release of the pollution.
Id.
288. Id. at *17.
289. Id.
290. Id. at *18.  “While the government may be disadvantaged by such burden shifting,
such a scenario was explicitly contemplated by the courts in Atlantic Research . . . .” Id.
291. See N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FirstEnergy Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 417, 488
(N.D.N.Y. 2011).
292. Id.
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Burlington Northern,293 which upheld the apportioning of liability between
parties under Section 107(a).294  In FirstEnergy, the court held that:
A PRP may avoid joint and several liability by proving that the
harm caused by that party is distinct from the harm caused by other
PRPs and additionally “proffer[ing] a reasonable basis for deter-
mining the proportional contribution . . . to what may be conceived
of as a single harm at each site.”295
The court also noted, however, that according to Burlington Northern, the
“‘[e]quitable considerations [applicable to allocation under Section 113(f)]
play no role in the apportionment analysis; rather, apportionment is proper
only when the evidence supports the divisibility of damages jointly caused
by the PRPs.’”296
Although opinions in the Fourth Circuit did not expressly adopt the
Cooper and Atlantic Research opinions in their decisions, the courts recog-
nized that Section 107 allows PRPs to recover potentially all costs from
other PRPs, and the defendant is entitled to bring a Section 113 claim
against both the plaintiff and other third parties.297  In Ashley II of Charles-
ton, LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc., the district court entered judgment in favor
of the plaintiff and held that the defendant was jointly and severally liable
for all costs already incurred by the plaintiff, plus interest.298  Without rely-
ing on Cooper or Atlantic Research expressly, the court held that a PRP may
bring a Section 107 claim against other PRPs.299  The court noted that
proving divisibility can be difficult, but nevertheless declined to apportion
293. Id. at 489 (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe. R.R. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599
(2009)).
294. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 614.
295. FirstEnergy, 808 F.2d at 488 (quoting United States v. Alcan Aluminum, 315 F.3d
179 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1103 (2004)).
296. Id. at 489 n.35 (quoting Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 615). But see Litgo N.J.,
Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 725 F.3d 369, 383 (3d Cir. 2013).
After identifying PRPs, courts allocate response costs based on equitable factors.
An operator who has participated in remediation without slowing or interfering
with that process likely will not be assessed a large share of the remediation costs,
if it is assessed any at all.  An operator who has delayed with remediation, how-
ever, may still receive a share of the remediation costs in accordance with CER-
CLA’s purpose of encouraging prompt cleanup.
Id. (citations omitted).
297. See, e.g., S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., No. 2:06-cv-02627-CWH, 2012
WL 1432543, at *135 (D.S.C. Apr. 11, 2012); Ashley II of Charleston, LLC v. PCS Nitro-
gen, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 2d 431, 507 (D.S.C. 2011).
298. Ashley II, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 507.
299. Id. at 481.  If the harm is indivisible, the liability under CERCLA Section 107(a)
will be joint and several. Id.
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the liability when lacking a reasonable basis, and held that the appropriate
remedy is imposing joint and several liability.300  In South Carolina Electric
& Gas Co. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., it was held that a defendant may pose a
Section 113 contribution counterclaim against the plaintiff using Section 107
for cost recovery as first articulated in Atlantic Research.301
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois
followed a different path.  In its decision in Conocophillips Pipe Line Co. v.
Rogers Cartage Co., the court declined to follow Second and Third Circuits’
post-Atlantic Research holdings302 that limited the defendant PRPs’ right to
assert direct claims against other PRPs under Section 107.303  The court
reasoned that because the defendant in a cost recovery lawsuit can bring
Section 113 counterclaims against the plaintiff to mitigate any potential in-
equity in the allocation of costs, the Atlantic Research opinion should be
interpreted to fully open Section 107 litigation without disqualification to
any private party, regardless of distinct facts or procedural circumstances.304
After the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit distin-
guished between Sections 107 and 113 in ITT Industries v. BorgWarner,
Inc.,305 the district courts in the Sixth Circuit consistently held that Section
107(a) will apply to a party which has itself “incurred” cleanup costs, as
opposed to reimbursing costs paid by other parties, which is appropriately
covered under Section 113(f).306  This seems like an appropriate analysis.
However, one court reaffirmed its holdings that Section 113 is the only
remedy available to settling parties.307  And any party would be ill advised
to not settle before attempting any cost recovery or contribution action.
300. Id. at 482.  The defendant who seeks Section 113 contributions against the plaintiff
and other PRPs bears the burden to prove divisibility. Id.
301. S.C. Electric, 2012 WL 1432543, at *136.
302. Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 225–26 (3d Cir.
2010); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 128 (2d Cir.
2010).
303. Conocophillips Pipe Line Co. v. Rogers Cartage Co., No. 3:11-cv-497-DRH-
DGW, 2012 WL 1231998, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2012).
304. Id.
305. ITT Indus. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 506 F.3d 452, 456 (6th Cir. 2007).
306. Id.; Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091–93
(S.D. Ohio 2013); Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1021
(S.D. Ohio 2011); Tennessee v. Roane Holdings Ltd., 835 F. Supp. 2d 527, 533–34 (E.D.
Tenn. 2011).
307. ITT Indus., Inc. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 640, 646–48 (W.D. Mich.
2009).  On remand, the Western District of Michigan held that the plaintiff, who incurred
cleanup costs pursuant to a consent decree, could not bring a Section 107 claim for that site.
Id. at 648.
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2. Disqualification of Section 107
As noted earlier, the Central District of California used the “procedural
distinctness” theory to determine a PRP’s appropriate cost reallocation rem-
edy in Whittaker Corp. v. United States.308  The Ninth Circuit overruled a
district court to hold that just because a company has been sued under
CERCLA does not limit it only to use of a Section 113 contribution action
to recover cleanup costs at a separate, but related, site.309  A Section 107
cost recovery claim could be pursued by military contractor Whittaker
Corp. against the federal government at one site in California, even though
it was sued by other parties for contamination at an adjacent site, since its
expenditures incurred were separate.310
The Eastern District of Tennessee found this reasoning of burden-shift-
ing persuasive in limiting a party’s remedy to Section 113 contribution when
it had entered into an AOC and consent decree with the state.311  In Tennes-
see v. Roan Holdings, Ltd, the court acted in line with other district courts
that prevented parties who settled their liability under an AOC from seek-
ing cost recovery under Section 107.312  This court relied on the reasoning
in Agere that explained the potential for an “inequitable” shifting of costs
onto other PRPs when the claimant had already settled with a governmental
agency.313
In a more recent decision, NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co.,
the court was faced with deciding once more whether Sections 107 or 113
was a more suitable remedy for a private party plaintiff.314  This court fol-
lowed its previous decision in Bernstein stating:
[i]f a party already has been subjected to an action under section
106 or 107, or has ‘resolved its liability to the United States or a
308. See supra notes 151–154 and accompanying text; Whittaker Corp. v. United States, R
No. CV 13-1741 FMO (JCx), 2014 WL 631113, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2014).  “PRPs that
have been subject to §§ 106 or 107 enforcement actions are still required to use § 113, thereby
ensuring its continued vitality.” Id.
309. Whittaker Corp. v. United States, No. 14-55385, 2016 WL 3244838 (9th Cir. June
13, 2016).
310. Id. at *9.
311. Tennessee v. Roan Holdings, Ltd., 835 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Tenn. 2011).
312. Id.  This is similar to Centerior Service. Co. v. ACME Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153
F.3d 344, 351–52 (6th Cir. 1998), and LWD PRP Group v. ACF Industries, LLC, No. 5:12-
CV-00127-JHM, 2014 WL 901648, at *6 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 7, 2014), both holding that poten-
tially responsible parties could not bring joint and several cost recovery action but were
restricted to action for contribution.
313. Roan Holdings, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 539–40 (citing Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced
Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 227–28 (3d Cir. 2010)).
314. NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682, 690 (7th Cir. 2014),
reh’g denied (2014).
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State for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the
costs of such action in an administrative or judicially approved set-
tlement,’ it must proceed under section 113(f).315
The Court also followed Cooper by concluding that “a party that has not
been subjected to an enforcement or liability action, and that is not party to
a settlement, may proceed under section 107(a).”316  Thus, the court is re-
stricting actions to Section 113 contribution actions in lieu of Section 107
actions, only when all the requirements to bring a Section 113 claim are
present.317  Instead of restricting access to Section 107, the court is requir-
ing use only of Section 113 when the requisites for its use are present.
In Hobart Corp. v. Waste Management of Ohio, a district court construed
the Atlantic Research opinion to “ ‘not overrule decisions holding that claims
for costs incurred in performing a cleanup pursuant to a judicial or adminis-
trative settlement are limited to a contribution action under § 113(f).’”318
Persuaded by the Seventh Circuit opinion in Bernstein, the court held that if
a party resolved its liability under administrative or judicially approved set-
tlements, “a contribution claim under § 113(f)(3)(B) is the only possible
avenue of recovery.”319  This restricts claims to Section 113 if there has first
been a settlement with the government, which also triggers contribution
protection for the settlor(s).
Following the Sixth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit recognized that Sec-
tions 107 and 113 provide two distinctive remedies to PRPs, where Section
107 allows a person to seek cost recovery from any other person who is
liable or potentially liable under Section 107(a), and Section 113(f)(3)(B)
authorizes “[a] person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a
State for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of
such action in an administrative or judicially approved settlement” to seek
contribution from any person who has not so resolved its liability.320  The
315. Id. at 690–91 (citing Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 201–02 (7th Cir. 2012)).
316. NCR Corp., 768 F.3d at 690–91.
317. Id. at 691 (“Thus, although a strict reading of the phrase ‘necessary costs of re-
sponse’ in Section 107(a) might suggest that parties who pay pursuant to an enforcement
action might be able to sue under Section 107(a), this court—like our sister circuits—restricts
plaintiffs to Section 113 contribution actions when they are available.”); Bernstein, 733 F.3d
at 206; see also Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757, 767–68 (6th Cir.
2014) (agreeing with Bernstein that Sections 107(a) and 113(f) provide mutually exclusive
remedies).
318. Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1093 (S.D.
Ohio 2013) (quoting ITT Indus., Inc. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 640, 647 (W.D.
Mich. 2009)).
319. Id. at 1093.
320. Morrison Enters., LLC v. Dravo Corp., 638 F.3d 594, 603 (8th Cir. 2011).
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court also held that Section 113(f) would be the exclusive remedy for parties
who were compelled to incur costs pursuant to an administratively or judi-
cially approved settlement under Section 106 or 107.321
The legislative history does not suggest that the availability of Section
113 automatically disqualifies private plaintiff use of Section 107.  Cost re-
covery was initially drafted into the statute for “any other person” in
1980.322  Section 113 contribution claims were not added until 1986.  There-
fore, in 1980 when Section 107 was the only cost allocation mechanism in
the newly enacted CERCLA, there was no Section 113 contribution provi-
sion in the statute.  Arguing that Section 107 cost recovery was meant to be
available to “any other party” only if the not yet in existence Section 113
contribution was not available, does not follow logically or under any canons
of statutory construction.323  Section 107 cost recovery is distinct procedur-
ally from the subsequently added Section 113 contribution action.324
VI. CHAOS IN THE BASE TERRAIN
The Supreme Court’s decision in Atlantic Research clarified that “any
. . . party” voluntarily incurring waste remediation costs can use
Superfund’s Section 107 cost recovery provision.  In Atlantic Research, the
plain meaning of the “any . . . party” statutory language was unanimously
found to be unambiguous and contrary to how every federal circuit court
had interpreted the language.  However, probably because the Supreme
Court did not think “voluntarily” was an ambiguous term, the court did not
define its use of the term.  Many lower federal courts have employed their
discretion to supply the definition of this term in a way that frustrates
consistent implementation of the Supreme Court’s momentous unanimous
decision.  There is no plain meaning of “voluntarily” to various lower fed-
eral courts.  And the chaos that this and other legal mechanisms have cre-
ated across all the U.S. federal courts affect thousands of the multi-party
sites among an estimated 450,000-600,000 contaminated waste sites.325
As set forth in Sections III-V, some lower federal courts have rendered
decisions not granting private party access to Section 107, by differing on
what is or is not “voluntarily” undertaking a cleanup,326 by disqualifying
costs incurred at points in time after a private claimant’s settlement with
321. Id.
322. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1980).
323. See Ferrey, supra note 17, at 710–15. R
324. See, e.g., Morrison, 638 F.3d at 603.
325. SUPERFUND BENEFITS ANALYSIS, supra note 9; Office of Technology Assessment, supra
note 14; see also Hyatt, supra note 14. R
326. See supra Section III.
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EPA,327 and/or by rationale that the instant court prefers Section 113 to
Section 107.328  This final rationale, for a court to simply prefer Section 113,
should have been stricken by Atlantic Research’s reinforcement of Section
107’s plain language, which opens at the private plaintiff’s election this cost-
recovery avenue to “any . . . party.”
This is not just form, it is substance. The Superfund’s Sections 107 and
113 are not similar cost redistribution mechanisms for plaintiffs who clean
up hazardous waste: they can impose fundamentally opposed and different
types of liability, one requires successfully suing all other responsible par-
ties while the other does not, and they have often fatally different statutes
of limitations.  There are several decisions where a CERCLA private party
claimant was restricted to Section 113 under which its 3-year statute of
limitations then defeated the claim, though the 6-year statute of limitations
under Section 107 would have allowed the claim.  Using one of these sec-
tions can leave no legal remedy at all because of lack of prior EPA litigation
against the claiming party.329  These statutory provisions are not inter-
changeable to plaintiffs and change how billions of dollars of waste liability
are allocated in America.
The Supreme Court opinion in Cooper v. Aviall prohibits a private
party from initiating a contribution claim under Section 113(f)(1) of CER-
CLA against other PRPs, unless and until that plaintiff first has been sued
for response costs by (or settled with) the government under Sections
107(a) or 106 of CERCLA.  Even when a case meets this Cooper-defined
requirement for use of Section 113, it may be of limited practical use, be-
cause of Section 113’s much shorter statute of limitations, necessity to prove
each claim individually and severally against every last PRP to recover in
full, and lack of the possibility to impose joint and several liability.  Because
Section 113, post Cooper, is now in many cases not available or impractical
when available, Section 107 cost recovery becomes the key avenue for haz-
ardous remediation cost redistribution.
The impact of several of the decisions highlighted above, frustrating
voluntary private party cleanup and cost recovery under Section 107, is sig-
nificant in a system which depends as much on voluntary action as on
law.330  Private party remediation is the backbone that supports U.S. waste
cleanup: for every site on which EPA traditionally leads the cleanup, private
327. See supra Section IV.
328. See supra Section V.
329. See supra Section II.C.1 (examining the 2004 Supreme Court decision in Cooper
eliminating access to Section 113 if there has not been prior litigation or settlement).
330. See supra Sections III.A & B, IV.A.2 & B.2, V.A.2 & B.2.
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parties clean up 100 sites.331  A report by the EPA found that addressing
350,000 remaining contaminated sites in the U.S. would cost up to one-
quarter trillion dollars.332  This would require an expenditure of $6-8 bil-
lion annually—from all sources—over the next three decades.333  The Con-
gressional Office of Technology Assessment estimated that there are as
many as 600,000 contaminated waste disposal sites nationwide.334
As set forth herein, there is now selective lack of private party access,
within certain federal court districts and states, and within certain circuit
courts of appeals, to Section 107 cost recovery.  This results from the Court
in Atlantic Research not thinking it necessary to define one adverb, leaving
“voluntarily” as a critical interpretive point in lower court decisions.  This
selective interpretation of Atlantic Research in the lower courts has created
chaos and inconsistency in hazardous waste remediation.  The federal cir-
cuit courts continue to differ in their interpretations of CERCLA right of
cost allocation and recovery, even after two Supreme Court opinions.  The
chaos among the circuits encourages forum shopping for litigation involving
CERCLA cost recovery.
A decade after the 2007 Atlantic Research decision, under divergent the-
ories, many courts evade application of its basic holding.  In certain circuits,
it is difficult to discern any reopening of Section 107 consistent with Atlan-
tic Research.  The opposite has occurred in some circuits, breeding inter-
circuit inconsistency and confusion.  With no future Superfund case on this
issue pending before the Supreme Court, it is unavoidable and inevitable
that the chaos continues.
331. Ferrey, supra note 17, at 687. R
332. U.S. EPA, supra note 15, at 1–5. R
333. Id. at viii
334. Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 14; Pollution Locator: Other Contami- R
nated Sites, SCORECARD: THE POLLUTION INFORMATION SITE, http://scorecard.goodguide.com/env-
releases/def/land_other_sites.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2016); SUPERFUND BENEFITS ANALYSIS,
supra note 9.
